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SECURITIES LAW 
PROFITS IN PARADISE: WHEN RESORT 
CONDOMINIUMS QUALIFY AS 
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hocking v. Dubois,! the Ninth Circuit held that where an 
arrangement to sell a condominium included an option to par-
ticipate in a rental pool arrangement ("RPA"), the arrangement 
constituted an investment contract.2 Consequently, what ap-
peared to be a simple sale of real estate was subject to the provi-
sions of the federal securities lawss including the antifraud pro-
visions of Rule IOb-5.· This note will examine the rationale 
supporting the Ninth Circuit's application of securities law to 
condominium sales, examine the application of rules limiting 
private causes of action, and analyze the issues presented by the 
facts of Hocking. 
1. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other members of the panel were 
Goodwin and Hug, JJ.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
2. [d. at 563. 
3. The securities laws discussed in this note include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("1934 Act"). 
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). See infra note 161. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated 
under § lOb of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982), see infra note 159. 
Although not mentioned in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Hocking also sought to re-
cover damages for violations of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), see infra note 
184; § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), see infra note 183; and § 17 of the 1933 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982), see infra note 190. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, 
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II. FACTS 
While visiting Hawaii, Gerald Hocking became interested in 
buying a Hawaiian condominium as an investment. ~ When he 
returned to his home in Las Vegas, he met with Maylee Dubois, 
a real estate agent licensed in Hawaii and employed by a Hawai-
ian real estate brokerage firm.S Dubois agreed to help Hocking 
find a suitable unit.7 Dubois found such a unit offered for sale by 
Tovick and Yaacov Liberman.8 
The condominium unit was located in a resort complex de-
veloped by Aetna Life Insurance Company ("Aetna").9 As part 
of the original development, Aetna had offered the Libermans 
an opportunity to participate in an RP A in which an agent of 
AetnalO was responsible for renting and managing the units.ll 
The RP A pooled income earned on the rental of condominium 
units owned by participants.12 Each owner received a pro rata 
share of income and expenses regardless of whether his unit was 
actually rented.13 The RP A was optional and the Libermans had 
elected not to participate.H Prior to the sale, Dubois advised 
Hocking of the existence of the RPA and that it was available to 
individuals owning condominiums in the resort complex.l~ Hock-
5. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 563. 
6.Id. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. Hocking asserts that he initially believed that he was purchasing the condo-
minium unit as a first purchaser from the developer. Appellant's Brief On Rehearing En 
Bane at 4, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). While Hocking later became 
aware that he was a second purchaser, he still believed that he was dealing with an RPA 
company provided by the developer. Id. 
9. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 563. 
10. Id. The court noted that the record was not clear as to the exact relationship 
between Hotel Corporation of the Pacific and the developer, Aetna. Id. 
11.Id. 
12. Id. at 563 n.2. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 563. 
15. Id. Dubois denied that the offer included an option to participate in an RPA. Id. 
at 562 n.1. The district court did not make a finding with regard to the offer but ordered 
summary judgment for defendant on the ground that a condominium did not constitute 
a security if the RPA was optional. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that for 
purposes of summary judgment, an issue of material fact was raised as to whether the 
offer to Hocking included an option to participate in an RPA because Hocking's affida-
vits indicated that he had been informed of the availability of the RPA by Dubois and 
that he would not have purchased the condominium without an option to participate in 
an RPA. Id. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine 
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ing purchased the Libermans' condominium unit and subse-
quently entered into a rental management agreement and RP A 16 
with Hotel Corporation of the Pacific. I? 
Hocking filed suit in federal court against Dubois and her 
employer, Vitousek & Dick Realtors, Inc., alleging various acts 
of fraud18 by Dubois in inducing Hocking to purchase the condo-
minium unit and in services she performed or failed to perform 
thereafter.19 Hocking alleged. violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of Rule 10b-520 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
("1934 Act")21 as well as violations of section 5,22 section 12,23 
and section 1724 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act").211 He 
also alleged state law claims of fraud, negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty.26 The district court held that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because no security was involved, granted 
summary judgment for defendants and dismissed the pendent 
state claims.27 Hocking appealed.28 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the condominium 
and RP A qualified as an investment contract.1I9 The Ninth Cir-
whether the offer had in fact included an option to participate in an RPA. Id. 
16. Id. at 563. The sale was completed June 23, 1979 and the agreements with Hotel 
Corporation of the Pacific were executed on July 5, 1979. Id. The agreements included a 
rental management agreement, apparently effective immediately and an RPA effective 
six months later. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Hocking alleged five different misrepresentations by Dubois. Joint Brief of Ap-
pellees Maylee Dubois and Vitousek & Dick Realtors, Inc. On Rehearing En Bane at 22-
23, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). Hocking alleged that Dubois misrep-
resented that Hocking would be the first purchaser from the developer of the Condomin-
ium. Id. at 23. Hocking alleged that Dubois misrepresented the value of the condomin-
ium, stating that it had a value of $135,000 when the value was much less. Id. The three 
other misrepresentations were made two years later and involved the listing of Hocking's 
condominium for resale. Id. 
19. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 563. 
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1988). See infra note 161. 
21. Rule 10b-5 is promulgated under § lOb of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). 
See infra note 159. 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). See infra note 184. 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See infra note 183. 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982). See infra note 190. 
25. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Hocking, 839 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 
85-1932). 
26. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 563. 
27. Id. at 562-63. 
28.Id. 
29. Id. at 563. 
3
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cuit has ordered that the case be reheard en banc.80 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT CONTRACT 
1. The Howey Economic Reality Test 
The definitions of security provided by Congress in the 1933 
Act81 and the 1934 Act82 list a host of transactions and are in-
tended to give the federal securities laws the broadest possible 
scope.88 By authorizing an expansive interpretation of the term 
30. Hocking v. Dubois, 852 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1988). 
31. The term "security" is defined in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) 
(1982), as follows: 
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of 
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate of subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity", or any certificate of interest or participation in, tem-
porary or interim certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or 
right to subscribe or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
32. The term "security" is defined in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(1O) (1982), as follows: 
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other 
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, in-
vestment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly 
known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the forego-
ing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of 
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the 
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months exclusive of 
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is 
likewise limited. 
33. Congress cast the definition of security "in sufficiently broad and general terms 
so as to include the many types of instruments that fall in our commercial world within 
the ordinary concept of security." Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d at 560, 563 (9th Cir.) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73 Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933», reh'g granted en bane, 852 
F.2d 503 (1988). The remedial purposes of the 1933 Act were "to prevent further ex-
ploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent and worthless securities 
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; 
4
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"security," Congress sought to prevent fraudulent promoters 
from eluding the provisions of the securities laws through 
"countless and variable schemes"84 that utilize technical distinc-
tions in the form of the investment opportunity offered. 311 The 
principal catchall provision in the definitional sections of both 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, and consequently, the provision 
that generates the most litigation, is the term "investment 
contract. "86 
The definition of the term "investment contract" was devel-
oped by state courts in litigation involving "blue sky laws."87 
While neither the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, nor the state blue sky 
laws defined an investment contract,88 state courts defined the 
term as a contract or scheme for the placing of capital or laying 
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profits from 
its employment.89 The state courts emphasized economic reality 
and substance over form by broadly construing the definition of 
investment contract to afford the public a full measure of 
and to protect honest enterprise seeking capital from the competition afforded by dis-
honest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion." Hocking, 839 F.2d at 
564 n. 3 (quoting S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933». 
34. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 564 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946)). 
35.Id. 
36. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Inter-
pretation of Federal Securities Laws, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1473, 1507 (1986). While the 
term "certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement" also quali-
fies as a general catchall provision in the definitional sections of the 1933 Act and the 
1934 Act, it has been treated identically to the term investment contract. Id. at 1507 
n.138. 
37. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1945). Certain state statutes were 
termed "Blue Sky Laws" because their provisions were aimed at regulating speculative 
investment schemes that had no more basis than so many feet of blue sky. State v. Go-
pher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920). The "Blue Sky 
Laws predated either the 1933 Act or the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Id. (Gopher Tire decided in 
1920). 
38. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. 
39. Gopher Tire, 146 Minn. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938 (certificate entitling holder to 
commission from the sale of tires was an investment contract because it involves the 
laying out of money to secure profit from its employment as an investment). 
As the definition of investment contract evolved, the blue sky laws were applied 
wherever individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the expecta-
tion that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some 
one other than themselves. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The definition developed by the blue 
sky laws and adopted by Howey is now considered to be the classic definition of an 
investment contract. Id. See Hocking, 839 F.2d at 564. 
5
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protection.40 
There are two fundamental types of real estate investments 
that can qualify as investment contracts. The first category con-
sists of investments in land that are expected to appreciate in 
value as neighboring parcels are improved. The second category 
consists of investments in land that can be managed to produce 
crops or rental income. 
The United States Supreme Court examined the first cate-
gory of real estate investment in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp.,41 where assignments of oil leases sold in conjunction with 
a promise to drill a nearby test well were held to qualify as in-
vestment contracts.42 The Court did not attempt to define an 
40. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. Howey cited the following state court decisions as find-
ing investment contracts to exist in a variety of situations where individuals were led to 
invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit 
solely through the efforts of the promoter or a third person: Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 
2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942) (agreement to sell mineral rights is an investment contract if 
investors were led to expect that they would lease the rights to an oil company sometime 
in the future); Klatt v. Guaranteed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12, 250 N.W. 825 (1933) (oral 
agreement to purchase bonds and payment in cash or property constitutes contract for 
purchase or sale); People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932) (contract 
promising payment of $7,500 one year after investment of $5,000 as earnings from 
purchase and resale of trust deeds, bankrupt stocks, and foreclosures was investment 
contract); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A. 193 (1932) (contract 
to lease rabbits and buy back offspring is security); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 
S.E. 855 (1930) (contract to use vendor's copyrighted realty transfer system and to re-
ceive 80% of receipts not a certificate of interest in a profit sharing agreement); State v. 
Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922) (installment contract to purchase land subject 
to various surrender options held to be an investment contract). Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 
n.4. 
41. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). In Joiner, defendants distributed literature offering to sell 
assignments of oil and gas leases. As part of the sale, defendants promised to drill a test 
well that would test the oil-producing possibilities of the offered leaseholds. [d. at 346. 
42. [d. at 351. The SEC brought an action in district court to restrain C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp. from further violation of § 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982) 
(prohibiting use of the mails in the offer and sale of unregistered and non-exempt securi-
ties), infra note 186, § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1982) (prohibiting 
fraud in connection with an offer of the sale of securities), infra note 190 and § 17(a)(3) 
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting fraud in connection with an 
offer of the sale of securities), infra note 190. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 345. The district court 
and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit both found evidence of fraud concerning 
the location of the properties with respect to the producing territory, [d. at 347 n. 4, but 
refused to order an injunction on the ground that the leases did not qualify as securities 
and therefore were not covered by the 1933 Act. [d. at 347-48. 
The Supreme Court held that the undisputed facts seemed to establish the conclu-
sion that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked leasehold rights. [d. 
at 348. Acceptance of the offer made a contract in which payments were timed and con-
6
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investment contract, but indicated that the term should be given 
an expansive interpretation. a emphasizing the economic sub-
stance of a given transaction rather than its form." Since the 
literature distributed by Joiner characterized the purchase as an 
investment and as participation in an enterprise,u the Court 
found the offer to contain the evil inherent in the types of secur-
ity transactions which the 1933 Act was intended to prevent.·' 
The Court refused to exclude the oil lease transactions from the 
scope of the 1933 Act merely because they were interests in real 
property.·7 The Court noted that in construing the securities 
laws, trial courts have not been guided by the nature of the as-
sets underlying a particular document.·' According to the Court 
in Joiner, an investment contract is identified by 1) the charac-
ter that the instrument is given in commerce, 2) the plan of dis-
tribution, and 3) the terms of the offer and the economic induce-
tingent upon completion of the well. [d. at 349. The sales literature made no mention of 
drilling conditions which the purchaser would meet or costs which he would incur if he 
attempted to develop his own property. [d. at 346. The literature assured the prospect 
that the Joiner Company would complete the drilling of test wells so located as to test 
the oil-producing possibilities of the offered leaseholds. [d. 
43. Joiner, 320 at 351. The Court held that the reach of the 1933 Act did not stop 
with the obvious or the commonplace. [d. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, 
whatever they appear to be, are alao reached if it is proved that they were widely dealt in 
under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "in-
vestment contracts." [d. 
Such a broad and expansive definition of investment contract has enabled the courts 
to find an exotic variety of transactions to qualify as investment contracts. See Glen 
Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2nd Cir. 1974) (sale of scotch 
whiskey combined with arrangements for cooperage, storage during maturation period, 
insurance, and assistance with eventual resale constitute an investment contract); Conti-
nental Marketing Corporation v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967) (offer to sell live 
beavers combined with offer of beaver boarding facilities and offer to buy baby beavers 
constitutes an investment contract). 
44. Subsequent Supreme Court Cases have offered clarification of the Joiner analy-
sis. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1984) (economic substance 
analysis used in Joiner is only proper when determining whether unusual transactions 
qualify as investment contracts, not whether any instrument can qualify as a "secur-
ity."); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53 (1974) (profits 
refer to capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment as 
in Joiner and not to the benefits derived by consumption of the item purchased); Howey, 
328 U.S. at 299 (definition of investment contract as a scheme whereby a person invests 
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of 
the promoter or a third party underlies the decision in Joiner). 
45. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 346. 
46. [d. at 349. 
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ments held out to the prospect.49 
The Supreme Court examined the second category of real 
estate investment in SEC v. W. J. Howey CO.ISO where it held 
that tracts of citrus acreage offered for sale in conjunction with 
service contracts qualified as investment contracts because the 
seller was offering an opportunity to invest in a large citrus fruit 
enterprise rather than a mere fee simple interest in land. lSI The 
Court articulated what is now the classic definition of "invest-
ment contract" as a contract, transaction, or scheme comprising 
of three elements: 1) an investment of money; 2) a common en-
terprise; and 3) an expectation of profits produced S9lelylS2 from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.1S8 The Court noted 
that the definition had been enumerated and applied many 
times by lower federal courts.1S4 
49. Id. at 352-53. 
50. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted an ac-
tion to restrain W. J. Howey Co. ("Howey") from using the mails and the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce in the offer and sale of unregistered and non-exempt securi-
ties in violation of § 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982), infra note 184. 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 294. The district court denied the injunction and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. 
51. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
52. There has been considerable controversy over the Court's use of the term 
"solely." See e.g., Murphy & Wagner, Looking Through Form To Substance: Are Mon-
tana Resort Condominiums "Securities"?, 35 MONT. L. REV. 265 (1974); Note, The Eco-
nomic Realities of Condominium Registration Under the Securities Act of 1983, 19 GA. 
L. REV. 747 (1985). 
In SEC v. Glen Turner Enterprises, 476 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
821 (1973), the court stated: "the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal 
limitation on the definition of an investment contract." Id. at 482. See also infra notes 
91-101 and accompanying text. 
53. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. 
54. Id. at 299. Howey cited the following federal court decisions as having applied 
the definition of investment contract adopted in Howey: Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 
746 (9th Cir. 1944) (bottling contracts received in exchange for whisky warehouse re-
ceipts containing an agreement that whisky would be bottled and sold for benefit of 
contract holders was an investment contract because the purchaser looked entirely to the 
efforts of promoters to make their investment profitable); Atherton v. United States, 128 
F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1942) (partial assignment of oil and gas leases constituted a security 
where purchasers looked entirely to the efforts of promoter to make the investment prof-
itable); SEC v. Universal Service Assn., 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939) (application forms 
which entitled a "charitable" donor to 30% of the profits from agricultural operations in 
which the donor took no active part were securities because the substance of a transac-
tion rather than its form was controlling); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 
1937) (purported bill of sale and contract for delivery of oil which provided that buyer 
would not receive oil but the proceeds from sale thereof was a security because the lure 
held out to the investor was ability to speculate on a possible rise in the price of oil over 
the next 25 years); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (con-
8
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The Court held that it was immaterial whether shares in an 
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal 
ownership interests in the physical assets employed in the enter-
prise.66 The fact that some purchasers chose not to accept the 
offer of an investment contract by declining to enter into a ser-
vice contract was also found irrelevant66 because an offer of un-
registered, non-exempt securities was also prohibited by section 
5(a) of the 1933 Act.67 It also did not matter that the enterprise 
was not speculative or promotional in character.68 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Howey definition of in-
tracts selling bulk whisky represented by warehouse receipts where payment was based 
on price received by seller after aging was an investment contract because money was 
entrusted to another with the expectation of profits or income through the efforts of 
others); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (tracts containing groves of tung 
trees sold in conjunction with a development contract were securities because investors 
paid money with the expectation of deriving a profit or income created through the ef-
forts of others); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (contracts for sale of 
silver foxes together with agreements to care for foxes constituted securities because the 
transaction involved the investment of money to share in the profits of a business ven-
ture conducted by others); SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1940) (shares in the 
ownership of fishing boats are investment contracts because such ship shares involve the 
investment of money and offer prospective purchasers the right to receipt of profits 
through efforts other than their own); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 
1939) (engraved trust certificates that entitle the holder to the income from shares of 
Bank of America stock owned by the trust are investment contracts because the trust 
agreement is a contract involving the laying out of money in a way intended to secure 
income or profit from its employment as an investment); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 
245 (D. Minn. 1935) (contract which created a business engaged in securities and com-
modities speculation whereby one party provided the money, received 60% of the profits 
and all of the losses while the other party provided skill in such speculation was an 
investment contract because it involved the investment of money for profits through the 
efforts of someone other than the investor). 
The SEC has used the same definition in its administrative proceedings. See, e.g., In 
re Natural Resources Corp., 8 S.E.C. 635 (1941) (oil and gas leases sold in five acre par-
cels are investment contracts where the expectation that such parcels will increase in 
value is based on the result of drilling operations conducted by seller). 
55. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
56. [d. at 300-01. 
57. 15 U.S.C. 77e(a) (1982). See infra note 184. Each prospective customer was of-
fered both a land sales contract and a service contract after having been told that it was 
not economically feasible to invest unless service arrangements were made. Howey, 328 
U.S. at 295. The representatives of Howey recommended the services of Howey-in-the-
Hills, a sister-corporation under common control and management with Howey. [d. 
While purchasers were free to make arrangements with other companies, 85% used the 
services of Howey-in-the-Hills. [d. The land sales contract provided for a uniform price 
per acre, the only variation being between areas containing trees of different ages. [d. 
Purchases were made in narrow strips of land, an acre comprising a row of 48 trees. [d. 
58. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
9
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vestment contract in Tcherepnin v. Knight/,9 In applying the 
Howey definition to an action concerning definition of "invest-
ment contract" under the 1934 Act,80 the Court held that the 
definitions of "security" in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are 
substantially identical:81 "[I]n searching for the meaning and 
scope of the word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disre-
garded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic 
59. 389 U.S. 332 (1967). The Supreme Court held that while a withdrawable capital 
share in an Illinois savings and loan association fit several of the types of instruments 
designated as securities under § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), 
see supra note 32, they most closely resembled investment contracts. Tcherepnin, 389 
U.S. at 338. The Court noted that the instruments met the Howey definition of invest-
ment contract because they involved an investment of money in a common enterprise, a 
money-lending operation, with profits coming solely from the efforts of others, the skilled 
management and employees of the savings and loan institution. [d. 
60. Plaintiff's claim stated a cause of action for recission on the ground that sales of 
the shares to plaintiff would be void under § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) 
(1982), if plaintiff relied on the false and misleading statements in printed solicitations 
delivered via mail in violation § lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982), see infra 
note 159, and of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 340.10b-5 (1988), see infra note 161. Tcher-
epnin, 389 U.S. at 333-34. 
The text of § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b) (1982), provides as follows: 
(b) Every contract made in violation of any provision of 
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every 
contract (including any contract for listing a security on an 
exchange) heretofor or hereafter made the performance of 
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any rela-
tionship or practice in violation of, any provision of this title 
or any rule regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards 
the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provi-
sion, rule, or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the 
performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the 
rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, 
shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual know lege 
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of 
such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule or 
regulation: Provided, (A) That no contract will be void by rea-
son of this subsection because of any violation of any rule or 
regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (3) of sub-
section (c) of section 15 of this title, and (B) that no contract 
shall be deemed void by reason of this subsection in any ac-
tion maintained in reliance upon this subsection, by any per-
son to or for whom any broker or dealer sells, or from or for 
whom any broker or dealer purchases, a security in violation 
of any rule or regulation prescribed pursuant to paragraph (1) 
of subsection (c) of section 15 of this title, unless such action 
is brought within one year after the discovery that such sale or 
purchase involves such violation and within three years of 
such violation. 
61. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 335-36. 
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reality."62 The elements of the Howey definition of investment 
contract eventually became known as the economic reality test.6a 
Generally, there is little difficulty in determining whether a 
given transaction involves an investment of money and therefore 
satisfies the first element of the Howey economic reality test.6• 
Even when there is no question that money has changed hands, 
however, there may be a dispute as to whether the money repre-
sented a loan as opposed to an investment.6Ci The courts examine 
various criteria to determine the economic reality of the 
transaction.66 
62. [d. at 336 (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (when interpreting investment con-
tracts under blue sky laws, form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed 
upon economic reality». 
63. See infra note 86. 
64. In Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 (1943), Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), Tcherepnin, 389 
U.S. 332 (1967), and Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1974), there was no issue as to whether an 
investment was involved. In Joiner, investors paid cash for oil leases. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 
346 ($10 per acre paid for rights). In Howey, cash was paid per acre for title to land. 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 295 (price per acre varied with age of citrus trees). In Tcherepnin, 
cash was paid by the plaintiff class for withdrawable capital shares of City Savings Asso-
ciation. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 332 n.2 (5,000 investors were alleged to have paid be-
tween fifteen and twenty million dollars for the shares). In Forman, shares of stock in a 
cooperative housing venture were paid in cash. Forman, 421 U.S. at 842 (purchasers paid 
$25 per share for stock) . 
. 65. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). The court stated: 
[d. at 1359. 
In one sense, every lender of money is an investor since he 
places money at risk in anticipation of profit in the form of 
interest. Also, in a broad sense every investor lends his money 
to a borrower who uses it for a price and is expected to return 
it one day. 
66. Union Planters Nat. Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 
1174, 1182 (6th Cir. 1981). Under the risk capital test, courts focus on six criteria to 
determine whether a transaction is an investment or a loan: 1) time; 2) collateral; 3) form 
of the obligation; 4) circumstances of issuance; 5) relationship between amount borrowed 
and size of borrower's business; and 6) intended use of the funds. [d. 
Th~ first factor, time, examines the length of time that the funds are to be retained 
by the borrower. [d. The longer the funds are to be held, the more likely that an invest-
ment, rather than a loan, is involved. [d. The second factor, collateral, examines whether 
the loan was secured by collateral when executed. [d. The existence of collateral is 
strongly suggestive of a commercial loan. [d. The third factor examines the form of an 
investment. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976). 
The fourth factor examines the circumstances of issuance. Union Planters Nat. Bank, 
651 F.2d at 1182. An investment is often procured through a public offering with an 
indication that there is an opportunity for speculation or investment. [d. The fifth factor 
compares the size of the amount borrowed with the size of the business. Great Western 
Bank & Trust, 532 F.2d at 1257. Where the amount borrowed is large compared to the 
size of the business, the transaction is more likely a loan. [d. The sixth factor examines 
11
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The presence of an investment of money was also called into 
question in International Brotherhood of Teamsters u. Daniel.67 
The Supreme Court held that a pension plan did not involve an 
investment of money because employees sold their labor primar-
ily to make a livelihood, not to make an investment.68 In most 
real estate transactions, however, where title to land passes from 
one party to another in return for a payment of money, there is 
no dispute as to whether the transaction involves an 
investment.69 
The courts of appeals disagree as to what constitutes a com-
mon enterprise.70 Some circuits require a pooling of the interests 
the intended use of the proceeds. Union Planters Nat. Bank, 651 F.2d at 1182. A loan 
will often be used to finance current operations while an investment will be used to ac-
quire new productive assets. Id. 
67. 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979). 
68. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Supreme Court held that a pen-
sion fund was not an investment contract because an employee makes no cash payments 
to the plan. Id. at 559. While an employee may be viewed as allowing an employer to 
place a portion of his total compensation in a pension plan, the economic reality of the 
transaction is that the employee is selling his labor to earn a livelihood, not to make an 
investment. Id. at 560. The "investment" in a pension plan funded by an employer can 
also be distinguished from the investments in variable-annuity plans purchased by indi-
viduals in SEC v. Variable Anuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (premium paid for 
variable- and fixed-annuity contract) and in SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 
U.S. 202 (1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of mixed variable- and 
fixed-annuity contract) because even though the interest acquired had intermingled se-
curity and non-security aspects, a substantial degree of the interest obtained involved 
the elements of an investment contract. International Brotherhood of Teamsters at 559-
60. 
69. See, e.g., Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566 (no dispute that the condominium purchased 
satisified Howey's first requirement). In their brief submitted on rehearing en banc, the 
defendants in Hocking argue that unless there is a relationship linking the offeror of 
land with the offeror of management services, the purchase of the condominium and the 
rental arrangement were two separate transactions. Appellant's Brief On Rehearing En 
Banc at 47-48, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (85-1932). Defendants do not dispute 
that the first transaction, the purchase of the condominium, involved an investment of 
money, but argue that there was no common enterprise. Id. They further argue that the 
second transaction, the rental arrangement, did not qualify as an investment contract in 
and of itself because there was no investment of money. Id. at 48. The merits of defend-
ants' linkage argument are discussed infra at notes 114-124 and accompanying text. 
70. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari on the ground that there is a split between the circuits). 
The development of the law concerning the common enterprise element of the 
Howey definition of an investment contract was mostly generated by suits for losses on 
discretionary commodity account. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 
F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1974) (fraud in connection with a discretionary commodities ac-
count). The ultimate holdings of the commodities cases became moot when Congress 
gave the Commodity Futures Trading Commission exclusive jurisdiction over commodity 
12
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of investors, or "horizontal commonality,,,,l while other circuits 
only require a relationship between the investor and the pro-
moter, or "vertical commonality."72 With vertical commonality, 
accounts. See Mallen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1105, 
1109 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (statements to the effect that discretionary commodity accounts 
may be a "security" are no longer valid). Courts continue to cite the commodities cases 
as authority for the common enterprise requirements of the various circuits. See, e.g., 
Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566 (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities Corporation, 497 F.2d 
516 (5th Cir. 1974) as authority for commonality requirement in Fifth Circuit). 
71. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits of the Courts of Appeal have adopted 
horizontal commonality, requiring that several investors pool their investments. See, e.g., 
Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Pa 1972) (discre-
tionary commodity account did not involve pooling of funds with other investors and 
therefore did not involve a common enterprise), aft'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974). See also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (individual discretionary commodity account not 
an investment contract because pooling of investors is essential to finding of common 
enterprise), aft'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, 
Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (as common enterprise requires both multiple 
investors and a pooling of their funds, spearate discretionary commodity accounts were 
not investment contracts). While the First Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, a 
district court in the First Circuit has adopted horizontal commonality. See Holtzman v. 
Proctor, Cook, & Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981) (Howey held to require 
horizontal commonality). 
72. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have adopted vertical commonality 
which does not require that investors pool their funds. A common enterprise is deemed 
to exist if the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the ef-
forts of those seeking the investment or of third parties. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973), citing Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mort-
gage Exchange v. SEC., 285 F.2d 162, 172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). 
See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (although common enter-
prise does not require strict pooling of interests but may be achieved if fortunes of inves-
tor are interwoven with those seeking the investment, a discretionary commodities ac-
count is not an investment contract because defendant earned flat commission regardless 
of whether investment flourished or perished); McGill v. American Land & Exploration 
Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985) (as horizontal commonality has never been a part 
of the law of this circuit joint venture for development of subdivision qualified as an 
investment contract); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 
1974) (discretionary commodities account was investment contract because congruity of 
investment not a prequisite to common enterprise so long as fortuity of investments col-
lectively is essentially dependent on promoter expertise); Commercial Iron & Metal v. 
Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973) (if the vice president in charge of the 
metals department implied that he would make all investment decisions and promised 
plaintiff large profits then the discretionary commodities account may qualify as invest-
ment contract). While the Eighth Circuit has not expressly embraced vertical commonal-
ity, horizontal commonality was implicitly rejected in Booth v. Peavy Co. Commodities 
Services, 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (action for churning of commodities account may 
be brought under 1933 Act) as noted in Christensen Hatch Farms, 505 F. Supp. 903, 906-
07 (D. Minn. 1981) (as existing Eighth Circuit cases have found discretionary commodity 
accounts to qualify as investment contract, horizontal commonality is not necessary for a 
common enterprise to exist). 
While there are no Eleventh Circuit decisions concerning commonality, Taylor v. 
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a venture that has but a single investor can be a common enter-
prise if the promoter's remuneration depends on the success of 
the venture.73 In the 'Ninth Circuit, the common enterprise re-
quirement will be met if either vertical or horizontal commonal-
ity is present.7• 
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,7& the Su-
preme Court held that stock in a cooperative housing project did 
not meet the traditionaP6 Howey definition of investment con-
tract because the investment was premised on a desire to con-
sume the item purchased,77 not on a reasonable expectation of 
Bear Stearns, 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983), adopted vertical commonality. Note that 
before the Eleventh Circuit was created on Oct. 1, 1981, the courts now comprising the 
Eleventh Circuit were controlled by the Fifth Circuit which adopted vertical commonal-
ity in 1974. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
73. Brodt v. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978). 
74. El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). While some courts view horizontal and vertical commonality 
as mutually exclusive, see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 622 
F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (adopting horizontal commonality court necessarily rejects 
vertical commonality), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), other courts have 
held that the adoption of vertical commonality does not necessarily reject horizontal 
commonality. See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1238 n.12 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
Although the Ninth Circuit has adopted the comparatively liberal standard of verti-
cal commonality, the likelihood that an investment contract will exist will often depend 
on whether the commonality standard is applied to the expansive but unsubstantiated 
representations of a promoter or limited to the terms of a collateral agreement between 
the parties. See infra notes 135-139 and accompanying text. 
75. 421 U.S. 837 (1974). 
76. [d. at 853. In Forman, plaintiffs urged the Court to abandon the profits element 
of the Howey definition of securities and adopt the "risk capital" approach articulated 
by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 
361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Khadem v. 
Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). For-
man, 421 U.S. at 837 n.24. The Court declined to apply the "risk capital" test in Forman 
noting that even if they were inclined to adopt such an approach, the doctrine would not 
change the result in Forman because the purchasers of the "stock" did not take any 
significant risk. [d. 
77. The court of appeals, the Supreme Court majority opinion and the Supreme 
Court dissenting opinion disagreed as to whether the facts of Forman involved a profit. 
The court of appeals found that there was an expectation of profit in the following 
forms: 
1. Rental reductions resulting from income produced by commercial facilities established 
for the use of the tenants, Forman, 421 U.S. at 846; 
2. Tax deductions for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable to interest 
payments on the mortgage, [d.; and 
3. Savings based on the fact that the apartments cost substantially less than comparable 
nonsubsidized housing. [d. 
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profits.78 As the investors in Forman did not purchase with the 
expectation of profit from the efforts of others,79 they could be 
The Supreme Court held that: 
1. While the income from the leasing of commercial facilities might be the type of profit 
traditionally associated with a security investment, such income in the present case, if 
any, is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the 
securities acts, I d. at 856; 
2. There is no basis in law for the view that payment of interest, with its subsequent 
deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes profit, Id. at 855, and even if such deductions 
were profits, they would not be the type associated with a security investment because 
they do not result from the managerial efforts of others, Id. at 855 n.20; 
3. The low rent derives from substantial state subsidies, cannot be liquidated into cash, 
and does not result from the managerial efforts of others and no more embodies the 
attributes of profit than do welfare benefits or food stamps. Id. at 855. 
The dissent argued that: 
1. The lease of commercial and office space generates income in excess of $1 million per 
year, Id. at 861, and even after deduction for expenses, the residue could hardly be de 
minimis, Id.; 
2. The tax benefits to be derived from a cooperative housing project require that the 
operation be run in a certain fashion, Id. at 862, and the investors must depend on the 
project's managers to operate the project in a manner that will realize the tax advantage 
for them, Id. at 863; 
3. While the majority attributes the low rent to state subsidies, it is simple common 
sense that management efficiency necessarily enters into the equation in the determina-
tion of the charges assessed against the residents. Id. at 861. 
78. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. The Court found that "there could be no doubt that 
investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live." Id. at 853. 
The Court analyzed the Information Bulletin distributed to prospective investors, find-
ing that while it described the advantages of living in a cooperative community, it re-
peatedly emphasized the nonprofit nature of the endeavor and did not hold out a pros-
pect of profits resulting from the efforts of the promoters or third parties. Id. at 853-54. 
Consequently, the Court held that shares of stock that entitled a purchaser to lease an 
apartment in a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, Id. at 840, 
were not securities within the contemplation of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Id. at 
847. 
In Forman, the Supreme Court stated that the focus of the securities laws is on the 
capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-
making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regula-
tion to prevent fraud and to protect investors. Id. at 849. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of the class action. Id. The action claimed damages, 
forced rental reductions, and other relief on the grounds that an information bulletin 
falsely represented who would bear the burden of cost increases and failed to disclose 
several critical facts in violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), 
infra note 190, § lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), infra note 159, and 
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986), infra note 161. Forman, 421 U.S. at 844-45. 
79. The Court noted that in some circumstances, the investor is offered a commod-
ity for both consumption and profit and that the application of the federal securities 
laws to such transactions may raise difficult questions that were not present in Forman. 
Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 n.17 (citing SEC Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 
18, 1973) (see infra note 154- 158 and accompanying text) and Rohan, The Securities 
Law Implications of Condominium Marketing Programs Which Feature a Rental 
15
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distinguished from the investors in Howey who had no desire to 
occupy the land or develop it themselves80 and from the inves-
tors in Joiner who had no intention of drilling their own test 
wells.81 
The distinction in Forman between consumption and an ex-
pectation of profits fueled a controversy over whether the eco-
nomic substance of a purchaser's acquisition of 100% of the 
stock of a corporation is to consume, i.e. to acquire a business 
for the purchaser to manage and control, or to invest, i.e. to earn 
profits from the efforts of others.82 The Supreme Court settled 
Agency or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1969)). 
In Forman, the Court defined profits as consisting of either capital appreciation re-
sulting from the initial investment or a participation in earnings resulting from the use 
of investors funds. Id. at 852. 
80. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. The Howey Court held that the transactions in that 
case clearly involved investment contracts because they offered something more than a 
simple fee interest in land. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. They offered an opportunity to con-
tribute money and participate in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise, managed 
and partly owned by the Howey Co. Id. Where an opportunity is offered to persons who 
reside in distant localities and who lack the equipment and experience requisite to the 
cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the citrus products, such persons have no desire 
to occupy the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospect 
of a return on their investment. Id. at 299-300. 
81. Forman, 421 U.S. at 853 n.18. In Joiner, the Court held that the undisputed 
facts seemed to establish the conclusion that defendants were not, as a practical matter, 
offering naked leasehold rights. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 348. Had the offer mailed by defend-
ants omitted the economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration well, 
it would have been quite a different proposition. Id. Purchasers would have been left to 
their own devices, either spending $5,000 for a test well or waiting an indefinite time 
until some chance exploration proved the productivity of their land. Id. From the stand-
point of the securities law, the distinction between an offer of oil leases with or without a 
promise to drill a test well was critical because the exploratory drillings gave the invest-
ments "most of their value and all of their lure." Id. at 349. 
82. In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982), 
rev'd, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) the Ninth Circuit compared the positions of commentators 
with regard to the sale of business doctrine. The court cited the following articles as 
endorsing the sale of business doctrine: Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale 
of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1982); 
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Com-
pany's Stock is Not a Federal Securities Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1982); 
Comment, Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchase of Corporate Stock: An Argu-
ment for Exclusion from Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FLA. ST. L. REV. 295 (1980); 
Note, The Security Status of Stock Transfers Incident to the Purchase or Sale of a 
Business: The "Sale of Business" Controversy in the Aftermath of Golden v. Garafalo, 
47 ALB. L. REV. (1983); Note, The Sale of Business Doctrine: A Decade After Forman, 49 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1325 (1983); Note, Function Over Form: The Sale of Business Doc-
trine and the Definition of "Security," 63 B.U. L. REV. 1129 (1983); Note, The Sale of 
Business Doctrine-Golden v. Garafalo, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1983); Note, The Sec-
ond Circuit Rejects the Sale of Business Doctrine, 57 TUL.L. REV. 715 (1983). 
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the dispute in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.s3 After review-
ing the Joiner, Howey, and Forman decisions, the Court deter-
mined that the economic substance of a transaction need only be 
examined in cases involving unusual instruments that are not 
easily characterized as securities.s4 As the sale of traditional 
stock is not an unusual transaction, but plainly within the statu-
tory definition of a security, there was no need to look beyond 
the character of the instrument to determine if the securities 
laws applied.slI The Court held that the economic reality 
The court also cited the following articles as repudiating the sale of business doc-
trine: Black, Is Stock a Security? A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine in Securi-
ties Fraud Litigation, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 325 (1983); Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and 
the Sale of Closely Held Corporations: When is Stock Not a Security?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 
393 (1983); Karjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation 
through the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; Prentice & Rozkowski, 
The Sale of Business Doctrine: Relief from Securities Regulation or a New Haven for 
Welshers?, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 473 (1983); Rapp, Federal Securities Laws Should Protect 
Some Purchases of All or Substantially All of a Corporation's Stock, 32 CASE W. RES. 
595 (1982); Comment, A Criticism of the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 974 
(1983); Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1718 (1983); 
Note, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 659 (1983). 
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the sale of business doctrine had been accepted in 
the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits and had been rejected in the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Landreth, 731 F.2d at 1351-52. The Ninth Circuit 
followed Forman in rejecting a literal interpretation of the definition of stock in favor of 
an inquiry into the economic realities of the underlying transaction. Id. at 1352. 
83. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The Supreme Court refused to recognize a sale of business 
exception to the definition of security holding that the securities laws apply to the trans-
fer of 100% of the stock of an incorporated business. Id. at 697. Reversing both the 
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action for recission of the sale of unregistered non-exempt 
securities under the 1933 Act and for damages resulting from defendant's misrepresenta-
tions and failure to state material facts as to the worth of the lumber company in viola-
tion of the 1934 Act. Id. at 684. 
In a companion case, Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985), the Court held that 
under Landreth, the sale of business doctrine did not apply to the sale of 50% of the 
stock in a corporation when the stock possesses all of the characteristics typically associ-
ated with stock. Id. at 706. 
84. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690. 
85. Id. In Landreth, the Court distinguished the "traditional" stock at issue in Lan-
dreth from "unusual instruments" such as the withdrawable capital shares at issue in 
Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336-37, and the certificate of deposit and privately negotiated 
profit-sharing agreement at issue in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. at 689 n.4. 
In Forman, the Court noted that while the name given an instrument is not disposi-
tive, neither is it wholly irrelevant. Forman, 421 U.S. at 850. The stock at issue in For-
man bore none of the characteristics traditionally associated with stock. Id. at 851. Un-
like the instruments at issue in Landreth, the stock in Forman was not negotiable, could 
not be pledged or hypothecated, did not confer voting rights in proportion to the number 
of shares owned, and could not appreciate in value. Forman, 421 U.S. at 851. 
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test86 was designed to determine when a particular instrument 
was an investment contract, not whether it fits within any of the 
examples in the statutory definition of security.87 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,88 the 
Supreme Court used the economic reality test to identify the in-
vestment aspects of a pension plan and to compare the signifi-
The instruments at issue in Forman also did not qualify as investment contracts 
because the economic realities of the transaction showed that the purchasers had parted 
with their money for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for personal consumption 
and not for the purposes of reaping a profit from the efforts of others. Landreth, 471 
U.S. at 689. 
86. The economic reality test examines all of the relevant facts of an offering before 
deciding whether the buyer expected profits from the efforts of another. Note, The Eco-
nomic Realities of Condominium Registration Under The Securities Act of 1933, 19 GA. 
L. REV. 747, 763-64 (1985). The term "economic reality" surfaced in Howey where the 
Supreme Court noted that the state courts had construed the term "investment con-
tract," so that "[fJorm was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon 
economic reality." Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. In Landreth, the Court stated that an invest-
ment contract did not exist in Forman "because the economic realities of the transaction 
showed that the purchasers had parted with their money not for the purpose of reaping 
profits from the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 689. 
The economic reality test is most closely associated with the third Howey criterion, 
expectation of profits from the efforts of another, because the third criterion was the 
focus of the discussions in Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 339 (profit depends on skill and 
honesty of managers), Forman, 421 U.S. at 854-56 (benefits of housing do not qualify as 
profits), and Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690 (under sale of business doctrine, a purchaser 
seeks to use or consume a business, not to earn profits from the efforts of another). 
However, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the 
Court discussed economic reality in conjunction with the first Howey criterion, invest-
ment of money, where it held that "[l)ooking at the economic realities, it seems clear 
that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood not [to be) making 
an investment." [d. at 560. The Court has not yet heard a case that turns on the second 
Howey criteron, participation in a common enterprise. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 
U.S. 1115 (1985) (White, J. dissenting) (certiorari should be granted to settle a conflict 
between the circuits as to whether the common enterprise requirement is satisfied by 
horizontal or by vertical commonality). 
87. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691. The Supreme Court refused to view Forman as re-
quiring that the economic reality of euery transaction be examined to determine whether 
the Howey test has been met. ld. The Court stated that "we cannot agree that the Acts 
were intended to cover only 'passive investors' and not privately negotiated transactions 
involving the transfer of control to 'entrepreneurs.' " ld at 692. The Court noted that 
while § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982), exempts transactions not involv-
ing a public offering from the 1933 Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable 
exemption from the antifraud provisions. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. Furthermore, the 
1934 Act contains several provisions specifically governing tender offers such as § 14 of 
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982), and § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982), 
and disclosure of transactions by corporate officers or by principal shareholders. Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. at 692. 
88. 439 U.S. 551 (1979). 
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cance of investment aspects with other benefits.89 The Court 
held than even when an investment in a common enterprise is 
made with an expectation of profit from the effort of a third 
party, the transaction may not be an investment contract if the 
investment aspects are too speculative 'or insubstantia1.90 
Under the Howey economic reality test, an arrangement 
that produces substantial benefits may still not qualify as an in-
vestment contract if the benefits are generated by the efforts of 
the investor rather than a third party.91 Although Howey im-
plied that an investor's efforts should be minimal, the Ninth 
Circuit held in SEC v. Glen Turner Enterprises,92 that "the 
word 'solely'93 should not be read as a strict or literal limitation 
on the definition of an investment contract."94 The court held 
89. [d. at 562. The Supreme Court held that the larger portion of the income of a 
pension plan comes from employer contributions, a source that is in no way dependent 
on the efforts of the fund's managers. [d. A pension plan's vesting requirements re-
present so substantial a barrier to the realization of any pension benefits that even if 
they were viewed as profit returned from a hypothetical investment, such profit would 
depend primarily on the employee's efforts to meet vesting requirements. [d. Conse-
quently, the economic realities of the transaction indicate that the possibility of partici-
pating in a pension plan's earnings is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the 
entire transaction within the Securities Acts. [d. 
90. [d. 
91. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The third criterion of the original Howey test required 
that there be an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third 
party. [d. While the "solely" requirement has been de-emphasized in subsequent cases, 
see supra note 52, an investment contract will not exist where the investors have effec-
tive control over the significant decisions of the enterprise. See, e.g. Rivanna Trawlers 
Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir. 1988). 
92. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 821 (1973). Contracts that entitled 
the purchaser to attend self-motivation and sales courses and which also offered the pur-
chaser the right to help sell the courses to others in return for a share of a commission 
were held to qualify as investment contracts. [d. at 478. The Ninth Circuit held that 
purchasers were not buying the usual self-motivation type of courses, but were buying 
the right to derive money from the sale of courses to individuals that the purchasers 
brought to "Adventure Meetings." [d. 
93. The Howey definition of an investment contract required an investment of 
money in a common enterprise from which there is an expectation of profit solely from 
the efforts of others. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
94. Glen Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482. The Ninth Circuit held that the term 
"solely" should be construed realistically so that the definition of an investment contract 
will include those schemes which involved securities in substance, if not in form. [d. The 
fact that an investor is required to exert some efforts if a profit is to be achieved should 
not automatically preclude a finding that the plan is an investment contract. [d. 
The more liberal interpretation of the term "solely" used by the Ninth Circuit has 
been adopted in nine other circuits. See, e.g. Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson 
Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988); SEC v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d 
349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3rd Cir.), cert. 
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that the third Howey criterion is satisfied whenever "efforts 
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably signif-
icant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the 
failure or success of the enterprise. "911 
Criteria for determining whether such essential managerial 
efforts are made by the investor or by a third person were pro-
vided in Williamson u. Tucker.96 An investment contract will 
not exist when the investor retains the legal power to manage 
the enterprise unless he is unable to effectively assert such 
power.S7 The investor who retains such legal power has not pur-
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2nd 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Group Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Williamson 
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Aldrich v. 
McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. 
Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976). 
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1974), the 
Supreme Court acknowleged the controversy over the "solely" requirement, but refused 
to express a view as to the holding of SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 476. 
Subsequent cases have noted that the recitation of the Howey test in Forman omits 
the word "solely" and have determined that the Supreme Court has "read the word 
'solely' out of the Howey test." Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1317 n.18 (5th Cir. 
1980). See also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir. 1981) (word "solely" 
omitted altogether from Supreme Court's definition of investment contract in Forman). 
95. Glen Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482. 
96. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The court stated that 
"[ilnsofar as the power retained by the investors is a real one which they are in fact 
capable of exercising, courts have uniformly refused to find securities." [d. at 419. 
The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits appear to have adopted 
Williamson. See, e.g., Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 
236, 241 (4th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Williamson to the extent that it does not imply 
that each partner's business expertise should be evaluated seperately); Deutsch Energy 
Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567, 1570 (9th Cir. 1987) (Williamson quoted with approval); 
Less v. Lurie, 789 F.2d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1986) (position of Eighth Circuit in Fargo 
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976), viewed as approaching position 
of Fifth Circuit in Williamson); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (quot-
ing Williamson with approval); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (Williamson followed). 
The Second and Third circuits appear to have adopted positions that conflict with 
Williamson. See, e.g., SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2nd Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982) (Williamson emphasis on legal rights held to conflict 
with Howey emphasis on substance over form); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 
103-04 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984) (powers expressly conferred to part-
ners under New Jersey law prevent general partnership from ever being a security). 
97. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419. The court noted that cases in the Tenth and 
Eighth Circuits had held that the actual control exercised by the purchaser was irrele-
vant. [d. at 421. So long as the investor had the legal right to control the asset he had 
purchased, he was not dependent on the promoter or on a third party for those manage-
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. [d. 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/13
1989] SECURITIES LAW 197 
chased an investment contract merely because he delegates some 
essential managerial duties to a third party.98 As a result, courts 
have held that partnership99 and franchise agreementslOO usually 
Notwithstanding the fact that an investor might retain legal control of an asset, 
Williamson noted three circumstances under which such legal control could not be effec-
tively asserted, and the investor would in fact be dependent on the efforts of another. [d. 
422-23. The three circumstances under which control could not be effectively asserted 
were (1) where the investor has irrevocably delegated his powers; (2) where the investor 
is incapable of exercising his powers; and (3) where the investor is so dependent on the 
particular expertise of the promoter or manager that he has no reasonable alternative 
than to rely on such promoter or manager. [d. 
98. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423. An investor's delegation of rights and duties, 
standing alone, does not give rise to the sort of dependence on others which underlies the 
third prong of the Howey test. [d. 
99. Courts have generally held that a general partnership or joint venture interest 
cannot be an investment contract because the owner has a legal right to participate in 
the management of the operation. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 421. On the other hand, a 
limited partnership interest may qualify as an investment contract. [d. at 423. See also, 
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 
1988) (investment contract does not exist where general partners have sufficient express 
powers giving them authority to manage and are not dependent on the irreplaceable 
skills of others); Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567, 1570 (9th Cir. 1987) (in-
vestor in general partnership had sufficient general business expertise as to be on notice 
that his ownership rights are significant and that federal securities laws would not pro-
tect him from failure to exercise those rights); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 
102-03 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984) (general partner in brokerage firm 
was unavoidably a part of the operation of the enterprise); Mayer v. Oil Field Systems 
Corp., 721 F.2d 59, 65 (2nd Cir. 1983) (where investing limited partner exercised no man-
agerial role in partnership affairs, courts have held that such limited partnership inter-
ests qualify as securities); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (managerial 
powers vested in general partners such as express right of inspection of documents gives 
them the kind of leverage and ability to protect themselves that takes them outside the 
scope of the securities laws); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 742 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983) (limited partnership was an investment contract with re-
spect to only those promoters who made claims of unique entreprenurial or managerial 
ability); Frazier v. Manson, 484 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (limited partnership inter-
ests were not an investment contract in the hands of a general partner of the partnership 
that managed the properties owned by the limited partnerships). 
100. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 420-21. The actual control exercised by a franchisee is 
irrelevant so long as he has the right to control the day to day operations. [d. See, e.g., 
Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1987) (while reputation and 
promotional expertise of beauty products franchisor are material to the success of a 
franchise, the franchise is not an investment contract because the day to day operations 
depend on the full time efforts of the franchisee); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
Inc., 570 F.2d 877, 880-81 (10th Cir. 1978) (Montgomery Ward agency agreement was not 
an investment contract because it required full time effort of investor and granted him 
control over advertising, personnel, and most decisions involving day to day operations); 
Bitter v. Hoby's International, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974) (restrictions on restau-
rant franchisee's discretion merely accommodated standardization and did not render 
the franchisee's efforts nominal); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 
670 (10th Cir. 1972) (even though a turn-key restaurant operation was sold, it remained 
a business which the investor could control and included the normal risks incident to 
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do not qualify as investment contracts. IOI 
2. The Definition Of Security Implied By The Structure of The 
Law 
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landrethl02 the Supreme Court 
used the structure of the securities law to determine which fac-
tors should not be included in the economic reality test. IOS The 
Court reasoned that if a factor is regulated by a provision of the 
securities law, a definition of "security" that eliminated the fac-
tor would contravene the purposes of the provisions regulating 
the factor.lo. Thus, the Court held that the provisions regulating 
tender offers prevented the sale of a business from being elimi-
nated from the definition of a "security" and the provisions reg-
ulating private offerings prevented private transactions from be-
ing eliminated from the definition of "security."lo~ 
In Landreth the Court stated "we cannot agree that the 
operation of any enterprise); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 640-
41 (9th Cir. 1969) (while brochure minimized the efforts which a paint distributor need 
exert and described the arrangement as a turn-key operation, the distribution agreement 
emphasized that the success of the distributorship depended on the efforts of the distrib-
utor and therefore was not an investment contract). 
A licensing arrangement was found to qualify as an investment contract because the 
licenses were sold to individuals who were not at all likely to attempt to manage the 
property themselves. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582-84 (2nd Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982) (licenses to sell dental products packaged with sales 
agency agreements were investment contracts because operation was conducted by 
agency and nothing suggests that licensees would be likely to terminate the agency 
agreement and take over distribution themselves). 
101. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 421. 
102. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). 
103. [d. at 692. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. The Court has always held that the definition of investment contract should 
be broadly construed. See, e.g. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (definition of investment contract 
broadly construed to afford investing public a full measure of protection). Landreth sug-
gests that the definition of investment contract must be broad enought so as not to 
render any of the Act's exclusions superfluous. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. The Court's 
language implies that whenever an exclusion is deemed to exist under some provision of 
the securities laws, the definition of an investment contract must be broad enough to 
include all transactions that would qualify for such exclusion. [d. 
While the facts of Landreth involved ordinary stock rather than an investment con-
tract, the Court's discussion appears to utilize the term "security" in a generic sense that 
would include any of the instruments listed under the definitions of security, § 2(1) of 
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982), supra note 31, and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), supra note 32. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. 
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[1933 and 1934] Acts were intended to cover only 'passive inves-
tors' and not privately negotiated transactions."lo6 The language 
of Landreth conflicts with an earliar postion taken by the Court 
in Marine Bank v. Weaverl07 where the Court stated that the 
securities laws do not apply to a "private transaction"lo8 involv-
ing a unique agreement. I09 While there may exist grounds for 
distinguishing Landreth from Marine Bank, the Court no longer 
appears to support an exception that excludes private transac-
tions from the definition of security.llo The "structure of the 
Acts" argument in Landreth appears to require that "security" 
be defined in a manner that will not render any of the provisions 
of the securities law superfluous. lll 
A "structure of the Acts" approach to the definition of se-
curity would tend to expand the definition of investment con-
tract. For example, the securities laws also distinguish between 
primary offerings, the offering of a security by its issuer, and 
secondary offerings, the sale of an outstanding security by its 
holder to another person.ll2 Under the "structure of the Acts" 
106. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. 
107. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). The Weavers plegeded a $50,000 certificate of deposit to 
guarantee a $65,000 loan to the Columbus Packing Company. [d. at 552. In consideration 
for guaranteeing the loan, Columbus' owners executed an agreement entitling the Weav-
ers to 50% of Columbus' net profits and $100 per month for as long as they guaranteed 
the loan. [d. at 553. The agreement provided that Weavers could use Columbus' barn 
and pasture and granted them the right to veto future borrowing by Columbus. [d. The 
bank used the proceeds of the loan to offset Columbus' overdrawn checking account and 
to pay overdue obligations. [d. Four months later, Columbus was bankrupt. [d. 
108. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 559. 
109. [d. at 560. 
110. While the language in Landreth clearly refutes an exception for private trans-
actions, see Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692, the Court seemed to concentrate on private trans-
actions involving the sale of a business rather than private transactions in general. [d. at 
692 n.6. In Landreth, the Court did not discuss its holding in Marine Bank other than to 
reaffirm its position that Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal 
remedy for all fraud. [d. at 687-88. 
111. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. The Court reasoned that the definition of security 
cannot exclude the transfer of control of a corporation because such a definition would 
render § 14(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982) (regulation of tender offers), 
superfluous. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. Furthermore, a definition of security exempting 
private transactions from the definition of security would not only render the exemption 
for such transactions in § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982) (provision 
exempting transactions not involving a public offering from registration requirements), 
superfluous, but would effectively exempt such transactions from the antifraud provi-
sions. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. 
112. See, e.g., § 4(6) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982) (exemption for secur-
ities sold as a primary offering to an accredited investor); § 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 
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approach set down in Landreth, the definition of security should 
be broad enough to include both the primary and secondary 
market in order to avoid rendering the exclusion for secondary 
markets superfluous. 11s 
3. Linkage Between Promoter and Party Offering Services 
One of the issues arising with respect to both categories of 
real estate transactions is whether there need be any linkage or 
relationship between the individual offering the investment and 
the individual responsbile for providing management services or 
making improvements. In Continental Marketing Corp. u. 
SEC,11" the court held that contracts for the sale, care, manage-
ment and resale of live beavers qualified as investment con-
tracts. llli While Continental's service began and ended with the 
sale of the beavers, it provided promotional literature that ex-
plained the financial benefits of owning beavers and described 
extensive beaver care services offered by members of the North 
American Beaver Association.1l6 The Continental Marketing 
Corp. sales literature recommended that a purchaser not take 
delivery of their beavers but place the beavers with one of the 
suggested ranchers. 117 
The Tenth Circuit refused to attach any importance to the 
fact that, unlike Howey,1l8 the sales company and the manage-
ment company were unrelated enterprises. I IS The court held 
that the "more critical factor is the nature of the investor's par-
U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1982) (exemption for securities sold as a secondary offering). 
113. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. 
114. 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967). 
115. [d. at 471. 
116. [d. at 468-69. 
117. [d. The literature noted that a beaver required a private swimming pool, patio, 
den and nesting box and that proper care required the services of a veterinarian, dental 
technician and breeding specialist. [d. at 468. The recommended ranchers made all of 
these services available at a cost of six dollars per month per animal. [d. Over 200 bea-
vers were sold and all of the purchasers elected to contract with one of the suggested 
ranchers. [d. 
118. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 294-95 (1945). In Howey, the W.J. Howey Company 
owned and offered tracts of citrus acreage to investors. [d. Management services were 
offered by Howey-in-the-Hills, a second corporation under direct common control with 
W.J. Howey Company. [d. 
119. Continental Marketing Corp., 387 F.2d at 470. Some of the recommended bea-
ver ranchers apparently sold live beavers in direct competition with Continental Market-
ing Corp. [d. at 468. 
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ticipation in the enterprise.m20 Where an investor merely pro-
vides capital with the hope of a favorable return, the transaction 
"begins to take on the appearance of an investment contract 
notwithstanding the fact that there may be more than one party 
... on the other end of the transaction."121 
The Fifth Circuit held in Roe u. United States,122 that 
where promoters advertised that a test well was to be drilled by 
a third party, oil leases offered for sale qualified as investment 
contracts "whether the test well [was] to be drilled by the sell-
ers, or by third persons either under, or independent of, their 
controL "123 The primary significance of the pages of promotional 
material was not their extravagance or possible misleading na-
ture, but in the fact that they promised great rewards, not from 
the operation of the leases, but because of the activities of indi-
viduals other than the purchasers.124 
B. CASES ApPLYING SECURITIES LAW To REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS 
SEC u. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.1211 and SEC u. W. J. 
Howey CO.126 represent two distinct types of transactions in 
which the transfer of an interest in real estate was held to be an 
investment contract.127 In Joiner, the Supreme Court held that 
an investment contract existed where the leasehold interests of-
fered to investors would appreciate in value as a result of im-
provements the promoter promised to make on a neighboring 
120. Id. at 470. 
121. Id. The court held that it made no difference whether more than one party was 
on the other end of the transaction or whether the parties on the the other end consisted 
of a principal and his agent. Id. 
122. 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961). 
123. Id. at 439. The court quoted Bloomenthal, SEC Aspects of Oil and Gas Fi· 
nancing, 7 WYo. L.J. 49, 55 (1953), stating "from the standpoint of the investor, it makes 
little difference whether the promoter points to a well being drilled by him or whether he 
points to a well being drilled by someone else." Roe, 287 F.2d at 439 n.5. 
124. Roe, 287 F.2d at 438. 
125. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
126. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
127. See Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351 (offers to sell oil leases advertised in conjunction 
with a promise to drill a nearby test well came within the definition of investment con-
tract); Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (offers to sell portions of citrus orchard made in conjunc-
tion with offers to manage the land qualified as an investment contract). 
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parcel.128 Howey, on the other hand, involved the sale of income 
producing land in conjunction with a contract to manage the 
land and remit the net profits to the investor.129 While the Su-
preme Court has noted that the Howey definition of an invest-
ment contract applied to Joiner, it did not articulate exactly 
how the facts of Joiner satisfied the elements of the Howey defi-
nition. lso Consequently, courts have differed over what is neces-
sary before either a Joiner-type or Howey-type transaction will 
qualify as an investment contract. lSI 
Joiner-type transactions most frequently occur when inves-
tors purchase land in a real estate development in response to a 
developer's representation that the land will appreciate in value 
as a result of improvements that the developer intends to make 
to other parcels of land.132 Applying the Howey criteria, courts 
have generally held that such transactions do not qualify as in-
vestment contracts because anticipated appreciation in response 
to proposed improvements does not involve a common enter-
prise ISS or does not qualify as "profits."ls4 
128. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 346-48. 
129. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300. 
130. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Court merely stated that "[s)uch a definition nec-
essarily underlies this Court's decision in S.E.C. v. Joiner Corp." [d. 
131. See infra notes 134-146 and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 
1980) (developer encouraged investment purchases by promising that lots would increase 
in value because of his activities in developing and providing amenities); De Luz 
Ranchos Investment, Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(developer's marketing material promoted Rancho California as a passive investment 
which would appreciate in value as a result of Kaiser's development of commercial facili-
ties); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (to promote the sale of 
individual building sites, the developer represented that Stansbury Park would be a self-
sufficient community containing a shopping center, health and cultural facilities, trans-
portation facilities, and abundant recreational facilities). 
133. See, e.g., De Luz Ranchos Investment, Ltd., v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 
1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (since developer did not promise to make improvements to the 
specific parcel purchased by plaintiff or to share the proceeds from development of other 
parcels there was no common enterprise); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 
(lOth Cir. 1978) (the mere fact that plaintiffs purchased lots from developer does not 
mean that they were thereafter engaged in a common enterprise). 
Courts have held that a common enterprise exists when the purchase money accu-
mulated from lot sales is used to finance the promised improvements. McCown v. Heid-
ler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975). 
134. See, e.g., Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R Street Assoc. Limited 
Partnership, 657 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.D.C. 1987) (purchasers were not led to expect 
"profits" but were led to expect a certain standard of maintenance); Bender v. Continen-
tal Towers Limited Partnership, 632 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allegation that 
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Some courts have held that a Joiner-type transaction will 
not qualify as an investment contract unless there is a binding 
collateral obligation to perform such improvements.lSII While the 
promoter in Joiner was obligated to drill the promised test 
well,ls8 it is not clear whether such obligation was essential to an 
investment contract or whether the promises contained in the 
promotional material were sufficient to create an investment 
contract.1S7 A number of subsequent cases have disregarded 
promises made by the seller that were not reflected in the sales 
contract.1SS Other cases have stressed the importance of the pro-
investors purchased condominiums with the intention of reselling at a higher price does 
not bring these transactions within securities laws); Happy Investment Group v. 
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (situation in which 
plaintiffs will not realize any actual profits on their investment until their lots are sold is 
unlike other investment contract cases). 
135. See, e.g., De Luz Ranchos Investment, Ltd., v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 
1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (sale contract did not oblige the seller to do more than convey 
good title); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (developer was 
under no contractural obligation other than to deliver title once the purchase terms were 
met); Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R Street Assoc. Limited Partnership, 657 
F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.D.C. 1987) (no collateral agreements beyond the agreement to sell 
certain condominium properties); Happy Investment Group v. Lakeworld Properties, 
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (no actual commitments to perform specific 
services). 
136. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 349. The Court held that it was unnecessary to determine 
whether the investors in Joiner acquired a legal right to compel drilling of the well be-
cause payments to the promoter were timed and contingent upon completion of the well. 
[d. 
In Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961), investors were only offered 
mineral leases. [d. at 437. While payments by the investors were not conditioned on the 
drilling of the test wells as in Joiner, the promoter apparently made substantial contri-
butions to the drillers of the test wells. [d. at 439. 
137. In Joiner, the Court noted that the exploration enterprise was woven into the 
leaseholds in both a legal and an economic sense. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 348. The Court 
noted that none of the leases had any value without the test wells and that, in an eco-
nomic sense, the well-drilling enterprise gave the leasehold rights most of their value and 
all of their lure. [d. at 349. 
In Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961) the Fifth Circuit interpreted 
Howey's restatement of Joiner to overcome any imputation that Joiner required collat-
eral activity be that of the seller or one under his control. [d. at 439 n.5. 
138. See, e.g., De Luz Ranchos Investment, Ltd., v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 
1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (seller's promotional material promised that it would develop 
retained land but no timetable was provided and the sales contract merely required that 
seller convey title); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (al-
though developer represented that self-sufficent community complete with shopping 
center would be constructed, there was no investment contract because the only contrac-
tual agreement between developer and purchaser was sales contract providing for trans-
fer of parcels); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975) (factual question 
concerning existence of investment contract exists where allegations provide that there is 
more than a mere offer and sale of lots in a real estate subdivision and that sellers were 
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motional emphasis of the developer.139 
In Howey-type transactions, investors purchase income pro-
ducing real estate in conjunction with arrangements in which a 
third party manages the property and remits the net proceeds to 
the investor.l40 The existence of an investment contract will de-
pend on whether the management arrangement satisfies the 
common enterprise requirementl41 and whether the manager or 
the investor is deemed to provide the essential managerial ef-
under contractual obligation to do certain enumerated things that would enhance the 
individual building sites in the project); Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R 
Street Assoc. Limited Partnership, 657 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D. D.C. 1987) (no investment 
contract existed because there were no collateral agreements to the sale of a fee simple 
interest); Bender v. Continental Towers Limited Partnership, 632 F. Supp. 497, 501 
(S.D. N.Y. 1986) (neither contracts or options to purchase condominiums were invest-
ment contracts because purchasers were merely drawn by an expectation of appreciation 
in value rather than to earn profits from the efforts of another); Johnson v. Nationwide 
Indus. Inc., 450 F. Supp. 948, 953 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (while developers may have suggested 
that condominiums were a good investment, there was no investment contract because 
there was no evidence of a collateral rental arrangement and reliance on the seller's man-
agement to enhance value of investment is not the type of third party effort envisioned 
by Howey), aff'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Rio Rancho 
Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (developer's promise to build 
roads and other improvements are not the type of managerial services contemplated in 
Howey and does not result in an investment contract because there was no promise to 
run the development); Happy Investment Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. 
Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (while sales literature gave impression that defend-
ants would build a subdivision, no concrete promise was executed with the land sales 
contract, no particularized skills were offered, and no services were performed after the 
land changed hands). 
139. See, e.g., Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 
1980) (promotional materials, merchandising approaches, oral assurances and contrac-
tual agreements were considered in testing the nature of the product in virtually every 
relevant investment contract case); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 403-04 (N.D. 
Ill. 1977) (investment contract may exist where promotional material contained a num-
ber of express promises). 
In Release 5347,17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988), infra note 158 and accompanying text, 
the SEC provided that "an offer of real estate as such, without any collateral arrange-
ments with the seller or others, does not involve the offer of a security." Id. 
140. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 295. 
141. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Shapiro, 665 F. Supp. 336, 340-41 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (Ninth 
Circuit rule that vertical commonality merely requires that there be a direct relationship 
between success or failure of promoter and investors was not satisfied where promoter 
received 5% of the profits because there was no interdependence of loses); Mosher v. 
Southridge Associates, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (W.D. Pa 1982) (as there was no 
pooling arrangement, participation in common enterprise was limited to the actual rental 
of the investor's own condominium, and there was no agreement to pool rental pay-
ments). See also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (commonality standards for 
various circuits). 
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forts.142 Where a real estate investor has legal control of his in-
vestment, a third party will not be deemed to provide essential 
managerial efforts unless one of the exceptions provided in Wil-
liamson applies. us Investors who purchase resort condominium 
in distant locations will generally be dependent on the expertise 
and abilities of the local manager and therefore will satisfy a 
Williamson exception to the essential managerial efforts 
requirement. I .. 
C. SEC RULES AND REGULATIONS RELATING To CONDOMINIUMS 
While most early condominium developments were almost 
entirely owner-occupied, condominium marketing campaigns be-
gan to emphasize the advantages of renting one's unit when not 
142. See, e.g., Commander's Palace Park Associates v. Girard and Pastel Corp., 572 
F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1978) (seller did not lead purchaser to expect that manage-
ment provided by seller would provide either the sole or crucial efforts needed to pro-
duce profits); Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1978) (investment did 
not meet Eighth Circuit's absolute reliance standard despite three-year non-negotiable 
management agreement for newly acquired apartment building because a new manage-
ment arrangement could be negotiated after contract expired); Fargo Partners v. Dain 
Corp., 545 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (purchase of apartment building in conjunc-
tion with management agreement did not meet Eighth Circuit's absolute reliance stan-
dard because investor retained managerial control through power to cancel management 
agreement on 30 day notice); FDIC v. Eagle Properties, LTD., 664 F. Supp. 1027, 1047-
48 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (essential management functions in sale and leaseback of building 
to limited partnership were not performed by third party because partnership issued 
accounting instructions to the building manager, required the mananger to obtain per-
mission before making capital improvements, and reserved the right to cancel the man-
agement agreement in the event of unsatisfactory performance by the manager); Perry v. 
Gammon, 583 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (where partnership merely elected to 
retain third party manager upon acquisition of apartment buildings there was no evi-
dence that the partnership had no alternative to reliance on third party management 
services). 
143. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). Under Williamson 
the three circumstances in which control could not be asserted involved an irrevocable 
delegation of powers, lack of sufficient sophistication to exercise powers and dependence 
on the particular expertise of the promoter or manager. See supra notes 96-101 and 
accompanying text. 
144. See Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 
1980) (investors could not rent out remote condominium campsites themselves and 
therefore were dependent on the advertising and management of seller notwithstanding 
the fact that the owners had a legal right to rent their own units); Wooldridge Homes, 
Inc. v. Bronze Tree, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 (D. Colo. 1983) (resort condominium 
qualified as an investment contract because third party operated rental pool, seller de-
pended on presale purchase committments for financing, and rental services provided by 
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in use.1411 As resort and leisure-oriented developments began to 
comprise an ever-increasing share of the condominium market, 
the typical condominium owner became an individual who lived 
out of state, was able to visit the unit only a few times a year, 
and relied on the rental income to pay for his condominium 
unit.14S 
In 1966, the Attorney General of Hawaii issued a ruling that 
both condominium and conventional real estate projects may be 
subject to securities regulation if offered for sale in conjunction 
with a rental contract arrangement.147 A year later, the SEC is-
sued a joint release with the District of Columbia, Maryland and 
Virginia stating that all four authorities viewed rental and pool-
ing promotions of real estate as investment contracts.l<lS 
In 1972, the SEC's Real Estate Advisory Committee pre-
pared a report advising the Commission of the importance of es-
tablishing guiding principles for determining when an offering of 
real estate is for personal use and when the offering qualifies as 
a security.149 An initial policy was established in a series of no-
action letters issued in 1971 and 1972.1110 
In 1973, the SEC issued Release 5347 to "alert persons en-
gaged in the business of building and selling condominiums and 
similar types of real estate developments to their responsibilities 
under the Securities Act."1111 While Release 5347 was merely in-
145. Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing Pro-
grams Which Feature A Rental Agency Or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1969). 
146. Id. at 1-2. 
147. Id. at 5 (citing Attorney General of Hawaii, Op. No. 66-12, issued March 29, 
1966). 
148. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4877 (Aug. 8, 1967). 
149. REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND Ex-
CHANGE COMMISSION 1 (1972), summarized in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,265. See Rosen-
baum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws-A Case in Govern-
ment Inflexibility, 60 VIR. L. REV. 785, 790 (1974). 
150. See, e.g., SEC No-Action Letter, In re Desert Heritage Corp. (Dec. 9, 1971) 
(investment contract exists where offer of condominium accompanied by with optional 
rental pooling agreement); SEC No-Action Letter, In re Surf tides Condominiums, Inc. 
(Feb. 7, 1972) (definition of securities under 1933 Act does not include condominium 
units sold without any management or rental arrangement). See also Burton, Real Es-
tate Syndication in Texas: An Examination of Securities Problems, 51 TEX. L. REV. 239, 
245-46 (1973). 
151. SEC Release No. 33-5347, 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988). In Hocking, the Ninth 
Circuit held that Release 5347 was controlling. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566. When the 
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tended to clarify when an offering of condominiums should be 
registered as an offering of securities,1112 courts have applied its 
provisions to a variety of transactions. l6S 
Release 5347 recognizes three scenarios11i4 under which the 
sale of a condominium unit would constitute the offering of a 
security: 
1. The condominiums are offered and sold 
with emphasis on the economic benefits to be de-
rived by the purchaser from the managerial ef-
forts of the promoter or a third party designated 
or arranged for by the promoter to arrange for 
rental of the units;UD 
2. The offering of participation III a rental 
pool arrangement;168 and 
Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear Hocking en banc, the SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae 
stating that Release 5347 "does not apply to persons who resell their own individual 
units after the initial project is complete and [who] have no such affiliation or selling 
arrangement with the pool operator." Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Amicus Curiae at 13, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
152. Release 5347, 17 C.F.R. 231.5347 (1988). 
153. See, e.g., Hodges v. H & R Investments, Ltd.,668 F.2d 545, 550 (N.D. Miss. 
1987) (SEC Release 5347 used to determine definition of investment contract for claim 
under antifraud provisions of securities law); Dumbarton Condominium Assoc. v. 3120 R 
Street Assoc. Limited Partnership, 657 F. Supp. 226, 330-231 (D.D.C. 1987) (SEC Re-
lease 5347 used to determine definition of security for RICO cause of action); Bender v. 
Continental Towers Limited Partnership, 632 F. Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (SEC 
Release 5347 used to determine definition of security for violations of securities registra-
tion rules); Mosher v. Southridge Assoc., Inc. 552 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-33 (W.D. Pa. 1982) 
(SEC Release 5347 used to determine definition of security for violation of securities 
registration rules). If an instrument qualifies as a security for purposes of registration, it 
should qualify as a security for other purposes as well because the attributes of the in-
strument deemed to qualify as a security will remain constant regardless of which provi-
sion of the securities laws is deemed to have been violated. See, e.g., Landreth Timber 
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 684 (1984) (violation of disclosure and antifraud provi-
sions); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 333 (1967) (violation of antifraud provisions); 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946) (violation of registration provisions); 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Company, 320 U.S. 344, 345 (1943) (violations of registra-
tion and of antifraud provisions). 
154. Some commentators have argued that Release 5347 is misdirected in that the 
guidelines are not responsive to the overall goal of securities legislation, that no consider-
ation is given to the fact that transactions which meet the guidelines may already be 
regulated by alternate agencies and that they tend to reaffirm the solely requirement of 
the Howey test. Murphy & Wagner, Looking Through Form To Substance: Are Mon-
tana Resort Condominiums "Securities"?, 35 MONT. L. REV. 265, 275 (1974). 
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3. The offering of a rental or similar arrange-
ment whereby the purchaser must hold his unit 
available for rental for any part of the year, must 
use an exclusive rental agent, or is otherwise ma-
terially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his 
unit.m 
Release 5347 provides that an '~offer of real estate as such, with-
out any collateral arrangements with the seller or others, does 
not involve the offer of a security."11I8 
D. AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Actl1l9 does not directly prohibit 
any conduct or activity, but authorizes the SEC to issue rules 
and regulations that condemn deceptive practices in the sale or 
purchase of securities. ISO In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b-51s1 pursuant to this authorization. ls2 
157. Id. 
158. SEC Release No. 33-5347, 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988). 
159. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982) ("§ 10(b)"). The text of § 10(b) provides as follows: 
§ 78j. Manipulative and deceptive devices 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national secur-
ity exchange-... 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors. 
160. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 
343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
161. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1987). Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
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Section 10(b) does not provide an express civil remedy in 
the event that it is violated and the history of section 10(b) gives 
no indication that Congress considered the problem of private 
suits under section 10(b) at the time that the 1934 Act was en-
acted. 163 Similarly, there is no indication that the SEC consid-
ered the question of a private civil remedy when it adopted Rule 
10b_5.164 
An implied right to a private cause of action under Rule 
10b-5 was initially recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum 
CO.1611 After Kardon, Rule 10b-5 became the primary source of 
an explosive growth in plaintiffs' rights under the federal securi-
ties laws.166 Twenty-five years later, in Superintendent of Insur-
ance v. Bankers Life & Cas. CO./67 the Supreme Court con-
firmed the overwhelming consensus of the district courts and 
courts of appeals holding that a private cause of action did ex-
ist. 168 Rule 10b-5 generated substantial growth in plaintiffs' 
rights because large numbers of plaintiffs gained standing 
through the implied right of private action and because the 
courts expanded the substantive scope of section lO(b), allowing 
new combinations of facts and novel causes of action to fall 
within the scope of section lO(b) and Rule 10b_5.169 
162. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 723 (1974). 
163. [d. at 729-30 (citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73 Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934». 
164. [d. at 730 (citing SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (1942». 
165. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The district court permitted the Kardons to 
assert a private right of action claiming that the defendants had defrauded them when 
defendants purchased the Kardon's 50% interest in a corporation for $504,000 without 
telling the Kardons that defendants had already committed the corporation to sell its 
plant for $1,500,000. [d. The following rationale supported an implied civil remedy: 
1. Allowing a private cause of action facilitates enforcement of the 1934 Act since 
the SEC cannot investigate and discover every violation; 
2. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b) (1982), provides that any con-
tract made in violation of this Act is void. If this is true, there must be a private remedy 
to recover monies paid over pursuant to the "void" contract. Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514; 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 implies a civil remedy in favor of anyone 
injured in violation of a statute enacted for the protection of the class of persons of 
which plaintiff is a member. [d. at 513. 
166. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under The Federal Securities 
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. J. 891, 892 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
LOWENFELSj. 
167. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
168. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730. 
169. Lowenfels, supra note 166, at 892. Examples of original and imaginative causes 
of action include: White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (rule 10b-5 violated 
by material misrepresentation regarding promissory notes, even though defendant was 
33
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A few years after Kardon, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held in Birnbaum u. Newport Steel Corp.I70 that the 
plaintiff class for a private damage action under section lO(b) or 
Rule lOb-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securi-
ties. I7I In the twenty year period after Birnbaum was decided, 
"virtually all lower federal courts facing the issue in hundreds of 
reported cases"172 followed Birnbaum. 173 The courts have carved 
unaware that statements were false); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 
F.2d 654, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1973) (shareholders of corporation purchasing car-leasing busi-
ness with newly issued stock may sue under 10b-5 even though not sellers or purchasers 
of stock), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 
417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff may sue corporation allegedly assisting bro-
ker's rule 10b-5 violations), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 
375 F.2d 393, 398 (2nd Cir. 1967) (broker permissible plaintiff under 10b-5 even though 
not investor); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635, 638 (2nd Cir.) (plaintiff 
forced to surrender stock in short-form merger sale for purposes of rule lOb-5), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Lowenfels, supra note 166, at 892. 
170. 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
171. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463-64. 
172. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731. 
173. [d. at 732. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 763 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(issuance of new common shares in refinancing plan that diluted plaintiff's equity was 
not a purchase or sale giving rise to a private action under 10b-5); Eason v. General 
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1973) (fraud relating to a guaran-
tee of notes was not in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, but plaintiffs 
were entitled to bring a private action because as investors, they were a special class 
entitled to protection), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 
153 (3rd Cir. 1973) (shareholders losses due to fraudulent mismanagement of corporate 
affairs are not associated with the the sale or purchase of securities and therefore do not 
give rise to a private cause of action), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Haberman v. 
Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1311 (2nd Cir. 1972) (agreement to sell stock to third party at 
a price above current market rate without informing other shareholders did not give 
those shareholders a private cause of action under lOb-5 because they did not participate 
in any purchase or sale); Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 344-45 
(9th Cir. 1972) (false representations that stock to be sold at auction was worthless did 
not give rise to a private cause of action by plaintiffs who did not purchase the stock); 
City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 227-28 (8th Cir.) (bank's behavior in 
making loans to plaintiff to facilitate purchase of stock did not fall within statutory cov-
erage of "in connection with purchase or sale of securities" and did not give rise to a 
private cause of action), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 
455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970) (fraudulent act involving stock of corporation did not give rise to 
a private cause of action to plaintiff who had acquired stock prior to illegal acts), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1968) (plain-
tiff did not have a private cause of action for diminution in value of corporaton's stock 
purchased after the corporation rescinded an agreement to acquire stock of another cor-
poration because the the fraudulent acts causing the rescission of the purchase agree-
ment did not involve the purchase of a security by plaintiff); Dasho v. Susquehanna 
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.) (private derivative action by shareholders concerning fraud 
related to merger qualified as being in connection with the purchase or sale of securities), 
cert. denied sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/13
1989] SECURITIES LAW 211 
a limited number of exceptions to Birnbaum,17' that form a doc-
trine that prevents fraud and punishes wrongdoing in many situ-
ations that do not involve a purchaser or seller of securities In 
the classic sense. l7Ci 
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,176 the Supreme 
Court upheld the Birnbaum rule based on the rule's longstand-
ing acceptance by the courts, the failure of Congress to reject 
Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation of the wording of section 
lO(b) and the similarity between the rule and the statutes in-
volved including their legislative histories.177 The Court noted 
174. There are three doctrines that have acted as exceptions to the Birnbaum rule. 
They involve the aborted seller, the pledge seller, and the forced seller. Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513, 1518 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The aborted seller (or purchaser) doctrine rests on § 3(a)(13)-(14) of the 1934 Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13}-(14) (1982), which includes contracts to purchase or sell within the 
definition of purchase or sell. The doctrine provides that where a plaintiff has a contract 
to buy or sell a security, the contract right will satisfy the Birnbaum rule, even if the 
contract is breached. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 803 F.2d at 1518. See also 
Mosher v. Kane, 784 F.2d 1385, 1389 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (history of abortive purchaser 
doctrine in Ninth Circuit). 
The pledge doctrine provides that when stock is pledged as collateral for a loan, the 
pledgor has constructively sold the stock and the pledgee has constructively bought it, 
even though no foreclosure has taken place. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 803 
F.2d at 1518. See also, United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(pledge of securities constitutes a sale under Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 
(1983). 
The forced seller doctrine involves the owner of stock in a corporation which has 
approved a merger which will require the shareholder to either exchange or sell his stock 
to the acquiring corporation. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 803 F.2d at 1518. See 
also Mosher, 784 F.2d at 1389 (forced seller doctrine provides that scheme whose pur-
pose is forcing seller to convert securities to cash or other consideration gives plaintiff 
standing to bring action). 
175. Lowenfels, supra note 166, at 895. Examples of private 10b-5 actions that were 
upheld although they did not involve a purchaser or seller include: James v. Gerber 
Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 945, 950 (6th Cir. 1973) (beneficiary of trust from which stock 
sold sued under rule 10b-5); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake, 419 F.2d 787, 803-04 
(2nd Cir. 1969) (plaintiff corporation, desiring to merge with defendant corporation, sued 
under rule 10b-5 alleging defendant and alternative merger partner conspired to sell 
shares below fair market value), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); A.T. Brod & Co. v. 
Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 398 (2nd Cir. 1967) (broker sued under rule 10b-5 to collect from 
investors who ordered but failed to pay for securities); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 
F.2d 627, 637-38 (2nd Cir.) (shareholder forced to sell to acquiring corporation is seller 
for purposes of 10b-5), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. 
Corp, 282 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir.) (company induced by fradulent means to sell its own 
stock is seller under 10b-5), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1960). See Lowenfels, supra note 
166 at 895 n.27. 
176. 421 U.S. 723 (1974). 
177. Id. at 733. 
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that in both 1957 and 1959 Congress declined to modify section 
10(b) to apply to "any attempt to purchase or sell any security" 
as requested by the SEC.178 
The Court also noted that the principal remedies created by 
Congress with the passage of section 10(b) were expressly lim-
ited to purchasers or sellers of securities. 179 Finally, the Court 
found that the Birnbaum rule served an important policy func-
tion in that it limited the amount of vexatious litigation. ISO The 
Court determined that a straightforward application of the Birn-
baum rule was most consistent with the factors that supported 
its retention. lSI All federal courts now deny standing to a private 
plaintiff who brings an action under 10b-5 unless the alleged 
fraud is in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.ls2 
178. [d. at 732. 
179. [d. at 736. Thus, § l1(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17k (1982) confines the 
cause of action it grants to "any person acquiring such security." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 
U.S. at 736. The remedy granted by § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), infra 
note 183, is limited to the "person acquiring such security." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 
at 736. Similarily, the remedy in § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982), limits the 
express civil remedy for a variety of fraudulent and manipulative devices to "any person 
who shall purchase or sell such a security," Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 736, and § 18 
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C § 78r (1982), prohibits false or misleading statements in re-
ports limits such remedy to "any person ... who ... shall have purchased or sold a 
security at a price which was affected by such document." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 
at 736. 
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court noted that Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514, justified a 
private cause of action under § 10(b) on the basis that it was implied by provisions of § 
29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982), supra note 60, holding a contract made 
in violation of the Act to be void. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 735. That justification 
is absent where there is no actual purchase or sale of securities. [d. 
180. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740. The court noted two reasons that the pos-
sibility of vexatious litigation under Rule lOb-5 is more likely than in other complaints. 
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740. First, the court noted that in the field of securities 
law governing the disclosure of information, a complaint which by objective standards 
may have little chance of success at trial may have a disproportionately high settlement 
value. [d. Second, the court noted that the abolition of the Birnbaum rule would throw 
open to the trier of fact many hazy issues of historical fact depending almost entirely on 
oral testimony and thereby inviting abuse. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723. 
181. [d. at 723. 
182. See, e.g., Gurley v. Documentation Incorporated, 674 F.2d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 
1982) (allegation that plaintiff was prevented from piggybacking On public offering, i.e. 
reselling securities acquired from a privately held corporation during such corporation's 
initial public offering, does not involve purchase or sale of security and therefore is not 
actionable under lOb-5)j Broad v. Rockwell International Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 437 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (transactions which create encumbrances on the security without altering the 
underlying ownership are not purchase or sale and therefore beyond purview of lOb-5)j 
O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54, 59 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (as defendant, not plaintiff was the purchaser of securities, plaintiff did not 
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Section 12 of the 1933 Act183 expressly provides a private 
right of action for violations of the securities registration provi-
sions of section 5 of the 1933 Act,184 but requires that there be 
have a private cause of action under lOb-5); Sacks v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 593 F.2d 
1234 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (transfer of security ownership necessary for a private action to lie 
under 10b-5); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 719 (8th Cir. 1978) (no 
cause of action under 10b-5 where fraud was committed after purchase and therefore was 
not in connection with purchase or sale); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708, 711 (6th 
Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs fraudulently induced into not selling stock do not have a private 
cause of action under 10b-5); Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(purchase of shares before receipt of fraudulent prospectus does not give rise to 10b-5 
action because purchase was not in connection with purchase of securities); Thomas v. 
Roblin Industries, Inc., 520 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3rd Cir. 1975) (failure to suggest or contend 
that plaintiff was either a buyer or seller of securities is fatal deficiency to lOb-5 action); 
Southeastern Waste Treatment, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 944, . 
953 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (plaintiff must demonstrate that he is either a purchaser/seller or 
party to a legally enforceable contract to purchase securities to bring private action 
under lOb-5); Wittenberg v. Continental Real Estate Partners LTD-74A, 478 F. Supp. 
504, 508-09 (D. Mass. 1979) (private 10b-5 action limited to fraud in connection with 
purchase or sale of securities, not fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs); 
WaIner v. Friedman, 410 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no private cause of action 
stated under lOb-5 where the plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor a seller, and no dam-
ages flowed to the corporation in connection with such purchase or sale); Thompson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 401 F. Supp. Ill, 113 (W.D. Okla. 1975) 
(misrepresentation causing plaintiff to continue to hold stock is not in connection with 
purchase or sale and therefore does not give rise to private cause of action under 10b-5). 
183. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). The text of § 12 provides: 
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, 
or 
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not ex-
empted by the provisions of section 3, other than para-
graph (2) of subsection (a) thereof) by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of 
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, 
in light of the circumstances under which they are 
made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of 
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain 
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known of 
such untruth or omission, 
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from 
him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for 
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any in-
come received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for 
damages if he no longer owns the security. 
184. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). The text of § 5 provides: 
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, 
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either a purchase or sale of securities.1811 Consequently, where a 
private right of action under Rule lOb-5 does not exist because 
there is no purchase or sale of securities, a private action under 
section 12 will not exist either.18s While section 12 provides a 
it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transpor-
tation or communication in interstate commerece or of the 
mails to sell such security through the medium of any pro-
spectus or otherwise; or 
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in 
interstate commerce by any means or instruments of transpor-
tation, any such security for the purpose of sale or delivery 
after sale. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transpor-
tation or communication in interstate commerce or of the 
mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any se-
curity under which a registration has been filed under this ti-
tle unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 
10, or 
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or 
in interstate commerce any such security for the purpose of 
sale or for delivery after sale unless accompanied or preceded 
by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) 
of section 10. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
to make use of any of the means or instruments of transporta-
tion in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or 
offer to buy through the medium of any prospectus or other-
wise any security unless a registration statement has been filed 
as to such security, or while the registration statement is the 
subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effec-
tive date of the registration statement) any public proceeding 
or examination under section 8. 
185. See, e.g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 
(1973) (purchase required for private cause of action under § 12 of the 1933 Act); 
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 405 F.2d 200 
(2nd Cir.), rev'd en bane on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968), eert. denied, 
395 U.S. 906 (1969) (purchase required for action under § 12 of the 1933 Act). 
The intent of the 1933 Act was to discourage high pressure salesmanship with regard 
to new issues by empowering the SEC to place limitations on the selling arguments em-
ployed. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 751-52 (citing H.R. Rep No. 85, 73 Cong., 1st 
Sess., 2,8 (1933).) In accord with Congressional intent, the SEC requires prominent em-
phasis to material and adverse contingencies in prospectuses and registration statements. 
Id. at 752-53. While § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), supra note 183, provides 
express civil remedies for misrepresentations and omissions in registration statements 
and prospectuses, recovery is restricted to purchasers. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 
752-53. Congress did not intend to extend a private cause of action to the non purchasing 
offeree for loss of opportunity to purchase based on an overly pessimistic prospectus. Id. 
at 754. 
186. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. While discussing remedies passed 
by Congress along with § lOb, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps noted that § 12 of the 
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private cause of action for an untrue statement of material 
fact,187 Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraud. 188 While an action under sec-
tion 12 need only allege that a material statement was untrue, a 
Rule 10b-5 action must allege scienter.189 
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a private right of action 
does not exist under section 17(a) of the 1933 Actl90 in In re 
Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litiga-
tion. l9l Consequently, even if the Ninth Circuit were to hold 
that an investment contract exists in Hocking, thereby creating 
jurisdiction under the securities laws, and even if the Ninth Cir-
cuit were to hold that a purchase or sale had taken place, 
thereby permitting a private right of action under section lOb of 
the 1934 Act and section 12 of the 1933 Act, no private action 
will exist under section 17 of the 1933 Act.192 
E. ApPLICATION OF BIRNBAUM RULE TO INVESTMENT CONTRACTS 
Generally, the rule of Birnbaum u. Newport Steel Corp.193 is 
no more difficult to apply to an investment contract than to any 
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), is limited to a person acquiring such security. Blue Chip 
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 736. 
187. Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). See supra note 183. 
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). See supra note 161. 
189. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (no private cause of ac-
tion for damages under Rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allegation of "scienter"-intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud). 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982). The text of § 17(a) provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of 
any securities by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon the purchaser. 
191. 823 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (private plaintiff does not have an implied 
right of action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act). 
192. See Note, A Remedy Without A Right: The Ninth Circuit Denies A Private 
Right of Action Under Section 17(A) of the Securities Act of 1933, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. 
REV. 221 (1988). 
193. 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
39
MacLaren: Securities Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
216 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:177 
other security.194 Unlike other securities, however, an investment 
contract must meet the three elements set forth in SEC v. W. J. 
Howey CO.1911 and these elements may be represented by more 
than one instrument.19s A difficult question arises as to whether 
each of the several instruments that comprise an investment 
contract must be sold or purchased to satisfy the Birnbaum rule 
and give rise to a private cause of action under Rule lOb-5.197 
In Marine Bank v. Weaver/98 the district court held that no 
cause of action under lOb-5 existed irrespective of whether the 
elements of an investment contract were present because the 
guarantee agreement did not involve a purchase or sale.199 
Marine Bank involved two agreements, a certificate of deposit 
and a guarantee agreement.200 The certificate of deposit quali-
fied as an investment of money, but was not a common venture 
194. Having determined that a given arrangement, such as a commodity account 
qualifies as investment contract, the Birnbaum rule is not satisfied unless the investment 
contract is purchased or sold as a result of fraud. See, e.g., Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. 
Supp. 1142, 1148 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (mere retention of commodity account as a result of 
fraud not sufficient to state private cause of action under Rule lOb-5). On the other 
hand, an additional investment in a commodity account or the opening of a new account 
would qualify as a purchase and thereby satisfy the Birnbaum rule. Savino v. E.F. Hut-
ton & Co., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (investment of additional 
funds in commodity account constitutes purchase and satisfies Birnbaum rule). 
195. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
196. In Howey, customers were offered two contracts: a land sales contract and a 
management contract. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295. While the land sales contract alone would 
not have qualified as an investment contract, the two instruments together were held to 
represent 1) an investment, 2) a common enterprise, and 3) an expectation of profits 
from the efforts of another. [d. at 298-99. 
197. Where, as in Howey, an investment contract is comprised of a land sales con-
tract and a management services contract, the law is not clear as to whether the cus-
tomer must purchase both the land sales contract and the management services contract 
to have a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5. 
In Howey, the SEC was held to have cause of action under § 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77(e)(a) (1982), supra note 184, regardless of whether the management contract 
was purchased because the term "sale" was interpreted to include the mere offer of an 
unregistered non-exempt security. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 n.6. Birnbaum, on the other 
hand, limited private actions under § lOb of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.§ 78b (1982), supra 
note 159, to transactions involving actual sales. See Jones v. International Inventors Inc. 
East, 429 F. Supp. 119, 127n.2 (1976). 
A private party could bring an action under § 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 
(1982), supra note 183, for the sale of such unregistered non-exempt securities in viola-
tion of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), supra note 184, but could not base a 
private action directly on § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). 
198. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
199. [d. at 554. 
200. [d. at 553. See supra note 102. 
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while the guarantee agreement involved a common venture but 
no investment of money.201 The Supreme Court held that a pri-
vate right of action existed with respect to the quarantee 
becuase it involved a pledge, one of the exceptions to the Birn-
baum rule.202 
Courts that have emphasized the actual terms (or lack 
thereof) of a collateral agreement in real estate cases over the 
representations of the seller are indirectly applying a purchase 
or sale requirement similar to the Birnbaum rule.2oa A more di-
rect approach was used in Koppel v. Wien,204 where the court 
held that participation interests in a real estate joint venture 
qualified as investment contracts,2011 but that a private cause of 
action was not available under lOb-5 because there was no 
purchase or sale of an investment contract.206 The court found 
that there were no allegations that the property had been sold 
for cash or even that defendants had entered into substantial 
negotiations.207 
There appears to be only one reported case in which a court 
attempted to apply the Birnbaum rule when part of an invest-
ment contract was involved in a purchase or sale and another 
part was merely offered. In Jones v. International Inventors 
201. See [d. at 556-59. 
202. [d. at 554 n.2. The Supreme Court ruled that under Rubin v. United States, 
449 U.S. 424 (1981), a pledge of a security was equivalent to a sale for purposes of the 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 554 n.2. See 
supra note 107 (facts of Marine Bank); note 174 (pledge as exception to Birnbaum). 
Having found that a private cause of action under lOb-5 was permissible, the Su-
preme Court then went on to find that the elements of an investment contract were not 
present. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555. 
203. See, e.g., De Luz Ranchos Investment, Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 
1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (where private plaintiff did not enter into an agreement obli-
gating seller to develop neighboring land as promised the court dismissed the 10b-5 ac-
tion on the grounds that no common enterprise existed); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 
F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (while developer represented that it had financial ability 
to complete planned residential community such representations were not included in 
land sales contracts and therefore court denied fraud claim on grounds that there was no 
common enterprise). Either court could have reached the same result by holding that 
failure to enter into an agreement or failure to include terms in an agreement prevented 
the transaction from qualifying as a purchase or sale as required by Birnbaum, and 
therefore prevented a private action under lOb-5. 
204. 575 F. Supp. 960 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). 
205. [d. at 966. 
206. [d. at 970-71. 
207. [d. at 971. 
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Inc. East,208 defendant argued that the purported investment 
contract with plaintiff consisted of two distinct and divisible 
parts consisting of an evaluation contract and a marketing con-
tract.209 The first contract expressly stated that defendant as-
sumed no responsibility beyond a fair and complete evaluation 
of the plaintiff's invention and made no guarantee that plain-
tiff's invention would be produced or marketed.210 While the 
marketing contract was offered to plaintiff, the offer was never 
accepted.2l1 As the first contract did not, by itself, qualify as an 
investment contract, defendant argued that plaintiff should not 
have a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.212 
The Jones court found defendant's argument "intrigu-
ing,"213 but held that it was "formalistic and certainly inconsis-
tent with the umbrella of investor protection afforded by the se-
curities laws."214 The court compared the case to the facts of 
Howey, noting that in Howey the Supreme Court had found the 
optional nature of a management contract or the existence of 
two promoters irrelevant.2Ui The court quoted the Howey 
Court's conclusion that because the 1933 Act prohibits the offer 
as well as the sale of unregistered non-exempt securities, "it is 
enough that respondents merely offer the essential ingredients of 
an investment contract."216 In relying on Howey, the court failed 
to distinguish between an action by the SEC under section 5(a) 
of the 1933 Act,217 which prohibits the offer of unregistered non-
exempt securities, and Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities. The Jones court's 
reliance on Howey would appear to be justified only where the 
208. 429 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1976). 
209. [d. at 126. 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 126·27. The court stated that "it is undisputed that plaintiff never exe-
cuted the second contract which contained provisions relating to the defendant's agree-
ment to use best efforts in marketing and promoting the invention." [d. 
212. [d. The court noted that Howey involved an action under § 5 of the 1933 Act 
where "sale" includes every attempt or offer to dispose of rather than rule 10b-5 which 
requires a purchase or sale. [d. at 127 n.2. For purposes of summary judgment, the court 
only reached the narrow issue of whether a security was involved, as required for subject 
matter jurisdiction, and did not determine whether plaintiff had stated a claim for a 
private right of action under Rule 10b-5. [d. 
213. [d. at 127. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. 
216. [d. (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300-01). 
217. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982). 
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cause of action merely requires that there be an offer of securi-
ties rather than the purchase or sale of a security. 
When the definition of investment contract developed from 
Howey-type transactions is applied to Joiner-type transactions, 
the result is an emphasis on the terms of the collateral agree-
ment over the representations of the seller. 21S Whether a court 
denies a private cause of action because no purchase or sale took 
place, as in Koppel, or allows a private cause of action in order 
to avoid a "formalistic" position, as in Jones, the fundamental 
issue is still whether the terms of the agreement or the represen-
tations of the seller should control the outcome. While Joiner 
held that an investment contract is identified by the terms of 
the offer and the economic inducement held out to the pros-
pect,219 the Court has never indicated whether or not one should 
be weighed more heavily than the other.220 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
In Hocking v. Dubois,'m the Ninth Circuit found the sale of 
a condominium combined with an "option" to participate in an 
RP A to qualfiy as a security and that the second of the three 
scenarios discussed in Release 5347 was controlling.222 The court 
held that the transaction qualified as an investment contract be-
cause the proposed sale included an offer to participate in an 
RPA.223 The court reasoned that while the first of the three Re-
lease 5347 scenarios would require some finding of fact with re-
218. See supra notes 125-139 and accompanying text. 
219. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943). 
220. Commentators have been noting that Supreme Court decisions are generally 
reducing the scope of the securities laws. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 166, at 892. 
221. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
222. [d. at 565. The Ninth Circuit found the second Release 5347 scenario to be the 
only scenario applicable to RPA's. [d. at 565 n.6. Under this interpretation of Release 
5347, a finding that no RPA was offered would apparently prevent an investment in a 
condominium from qualifying as a "security" for purposes of Release 5347 even though 
there was sufficient emphasis on economic benefits to satisfy the first Release 5347 sce-
nario. See Hocking, 839 F.2d at 565. 
223. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 565. A finding of fact was not made as to whether or not 
the proposed sale included an offer to participate in an RPA. For purposes of summary 
judgment, the proposed sale was deemed to include an offer to participate in an RPA. 
See supra note 15. 
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gard to the benefits emphasized during the sale of the unit, the 
presence of an RPA automatically characterized the condomin-
ium as an investment contract under the second Release 5347 
scenario.224 
The district court had held that the second scenario was not 
controlling because the RPA at issue was optiona1.226 The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed noting that in SEC v. W. J. Howey CO.,226 it 
did not matter that the service contract offered to investors was 
optional.227 Under the securities laws, it was enough that the de-
fendants merely offered the essential ingredients of an invest-
ment contract.228 The Hocking majority viewed participation in 
the Aetna RP A as an option to be exercised at any time by any 
owner of the condominium unit.229 Consequently, the majority 
reasoned that an offer to sell the condominium unit would nec-
essarily include an implied offer to transfer the option to partici-
pate in the RP A because any subsequent purchaser could elect 
to participate.23o 
The majority rejected the argument that the condominium 
ceased to be a security at the time the Libermans purchased it 
because the Libermans chose not to participate in the RP A. 231 
The court noted that it made no sense to contend that a condo-
minium ceased to be a security if an intermediate buyer chose 
not to participate in the RPA.2S2 If a unit in a condominium pro-
ject originally developed with an RP A could remain a security in 
the hands of successive purchasers until one chose not to partici-
pate,2SS then that unit could alternate between being a security 
and not being one if each successive purchaser were to make a 
different decision as to whether or not they would participate in 
224. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 565. 
225. [d. 
226. 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946). 
227. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 565 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 300). 
228. [d. (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 301). 
229. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 569. 
230. [d. The majority's use of the term "option" was not intended to connote that 
either Hocking or the Libermans had an absolute legal right to enter the RP A without 
the consent of the rental pool manager. [d. at 569 n.9. However, the court felt that it was 
of no significance that the pool operator retained some discretion, at least in theory, to 
refuse to contract with either Hocking or the Libermans. [d. 
231. [d. at 568. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. at 570. 
44
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/13
1989] SECURITIES LAW 221 
the RP A. 23. The court viewed such a result as absurd and far 
worse in effect on condominium developers and brokers than the 
more inclusive rule espoused by the SEC.2811 
The court compared the transaction to the three elements 
of the Howey definition of investment contract.28S There was no 
dispute that the first element of the Howey definition of invest-
ment contract, requiring that there be an investment of money, 
was satisfied because the purchase of the condominium involved 
an investment of money.237 The majority held that the third ele-
ment of the Howey definition, the expectation of profits from 
the efforts of others, was satisified, and would always be satisfied 
when a condominium is sold with an RP A option because there 
will always be an expectation of profits from the efforts of the 
RP A managers.238 
The majority's analysis of the second element of the Howey 
definition, involving the existence of a common enterprise,239 
clarified the standard used by the Ninth Circuit in prior cases.2•O 
The majority noted that horizontal commonality required a 
strict pooling of assets by two or more investors in a single in-
234. [d. 
235. [d. The SEC's position was set out in Release 5347 and developed in numerous 
actions. See e.g., SEC v. Marasol Properties, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 11 94,159 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1973); Embarcadero, SEC No-Action Letter [1976-1977 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 80,956 (Dec. 3, 1976). 
When the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear Hocking, the SEC filed a brief as amicus 
curiae stating that Release 5347 does not apply. Brief of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). The 
SEC argued that with the possible exception of Embarcadero, [1976-1977 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 80,956 (Dec. 3, 1976), the SEC has declined to take 
"no-action" positions where there was no affiliation or selling arrangement between the 
developer and the rental pool. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus 
Curiae at 14, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). The SEC noted that the 
"no-action" position taken in Embarcadero represented a statement of the SEC staff in 
1976 and was not binding upon the present staff or the Commission. [d. at 14 n.5. 
236. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566-68. 
237. [d. The purchase price of the condominium was $115,000 of which Hocking 
paid $24,000 in cash and executed an installment note in the amount of $91,000. Joint 
Brief of Appellees Maylee Dubois and Vitousek & Dick Realtors, Inc. On Rehearing En 
Banc at 10, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
238. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 567. 
239. [d. at 566. 
240. [d. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that when it embraced vertical commonality 
in Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978), it did not replace horizontal with 
vertical commonality, but instead broadened the meaning of common enterprise to in-
clude either horizontal or vertical commonality. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 567. 
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vestment fund,241 while vertical commonality required a depen-
dence on promoter expertise rather than the fortuity of collec-
tive investments.242 The court stressed that the Ninth Circuit 
accepts both horizontal and vertical commonality. us The trial 
court was instructed that if, on remand, it determined that the 
offer to Hocking included an option to participate in an RP A, 
then horizontal commonality would exist.244 If the trial court de-
termined that the offer to Hocking did not include an RP A, the 
trial court should reexamine the offer to determine whether ver-
tical commonality is present.2U 
The majority concluded that Release 5347's bright line rule 
reflects the only proper interpretation of Howey as applied to 
condominiums246 and that the facts of Hocking satisfied both 
Howey and Release 5347.247 
B. DISSENT 
The dissent argued that there was no connection between 
the Libermans and the RPA.248 While conceding that the securi-
ties laws may apply to a promotion by a developer who offers a 
condominium with an RP A, the dissent refused to apply the se-
curities law to the condominium offered for sale by the 
Libermans because Hocking merely purchased a parcel of real 
property and not the investment contract offered by Aetna.249 
The dissent distinguished the developer who offers a complete 
package of a condominium and RP A operated or arranged by 
the developer from an individual condominium owner who has 
no connection whatsoever with a rental pool. 2110 
241. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
242. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
243. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566-67. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (9th Circuit rejects strict requirement of horizontal commonality in favor of 
vertical commonality). 
244. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 567. 
245. [d. See, e.g., El Khadem u. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th 
Cir.) (court looks first for horizontal and then for vertical commonality), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 900 (1974). 
246. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 568. 
247. [d. 
248. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 572 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 
F.2d 503 (1988) (Hug J., dissenting). 
249. [d. at 571 (Hug J., dissenting). 
250. [d. at 572 (Hug J., dissenting). The dissent's attention to the fact that the 
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The dissent argued that Release 5347 was primarily in-
tended to provide developers with a bright line rule concerning 
when they must register their projects.2lH While the dissent felt 
that the first Release 5347 scenario was reasonably accurate,m it 
questioned the validity of the second Release 5347 scenario and 
whether the mere offer of an RP A could transform an interest in 
real estate into an investment contract. us 
According to the dissent, Hocking was not offered an "op-
tion" to participate in an RPA when he purchased his condo-
minium unit.2li4 The dissent noted that the majority opinion was 
premised on the conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the offer to Hocking included an "option" 
to participate in an RPA.2lili The dissent argued that the evi-
dence cited by the majority did not support a finding that an 
"option" was offered.2li6 
V. CRITIQUE 
The Supreme Court has noted that their cases "have not 
been entirely clear on the proper method of analysis for deter-
mining when an instrument is a security."2li7 One part of the 
problem is that courts are using a jurisdictional issue, the defini-
tion of a security, to shape the remedies available under the se-
curities laws.2li8 Another part of the problem is that the courts 
are still struggling with the paradox that while the rights sold by 
a seller may not qualify as a security, the rights purchased by a 
buyer may qualify as a security.2li9 An additional part of the 
Libermans had no authority to commit Aetna or Hotel Corporation of the Pacific implies 
that the dissent would require some type of linkage between the sellers and the party 
offering management services. See supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text. 
251. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 572 (Hug J., dissenting). 
252. [d. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. Judge Hug stated that "I found no evidence in the record that even sug-
gests an option was offered." [d. 
255. [d. 
256. [d. 
257. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 688 (1984). 
258. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 166 at 906-11 (1977) (use of definition of secur-
ity to circumscribe federal securities laws). 
259. See, e.g., Note, The Economic Realities of Condominium Registration Under 
The Securities Act of 1933, 19 GA. L. REV. 747, 769-72 (1985) (conflict beteen economic 
reality and economic emphasis). 
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problem is that courts are being asked to follow "doctrines" that 
reflect common themes, but are not in harmony with the securi-
ties laws as a whole.260 Finally, when the courts have examined 
real estate transactions, they have not settled on the significance 
of SEC Release 5347261 and their decisions often fail to consider 
that two fundamentally different types of real estate transac-
tions may not yield a uniform and interchangeable line of prece-
dents.262 Hocking v. Dubois26s confronts the Ninth Circuit with 
all of these issues at once. 
A. USE OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES To TAILOR REMEDIES 
Both majority and dissent were faced with a dilemma in 
that any net that is cast wide enough to catch all potentially 
crooked promoters will also snare a lot of innocent Libermans. 
Each rule or qualification intended to exclude the innocent 
Libermans provides a potential loophole that unscrupulous pro-
moters may exploit. One solution to the dilemma is to broadly 
interpret the Howey26' definition of investment contract to in-
clude all real estate transactions associated with management 
agreements261i while severely limiting private causes of action 
under lOb-5 through application of a strict interpretation of 
Birnbaum.266 
260. See, e.g., supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (distinctions between pri-
vate and public transactions); supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (distinctions 
based on primary and secondary market); supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text 
(linkage between promoter and party offering services). 
261. See supra notes 145-158 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 125-144 and accompanying text. 
263. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
264. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
265. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-301 (1946) (offer or sale of real 
estate and management contract is an investment contract). 
This note does not discuss the various problems that arise when a real estate trans-
action is found to constitute an investment contract. For example, when a real estate 
transaction qualifies as a security, the law may require the involvement of a licensed 
securities broker instead of, or in addition to, a licensed real estate broker. See Rosen-
baum, The Resort Condominium And The Federal Securities Laws-A Case Study In 
Governmental Inflexibility, 60 VA. L. REV. 785 (1974) (application of broker-dealer rules 
and regulation T to condominium sales); Burton, Real Estate Syndication in Texas: An 
Examination of Securities Problems, 51 TEX. L. REV. 239 (1973) (issue registration and 
broker-dealer registration requirements). 
266. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 353 
U.S. 956 (1952). See also supra notes 159-192 and accompanying text. 
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A "broad Howey/strict Birnbaum" policy would reduce the 
number of private actions287 while assuring that the SEC retains 
jurisdiction to pursue abusive transactions. 288 Such a policy ap-
pears to be consistent with the positions of both majority and 
dissent in Hocking. If a legally enforceable right to participate in 
the RP A had been transferred with the sale of the Libermans' 
condominium unit, the nexus sought by the dissent would exist 
and there would presumably be no objection to the private ac-
tion brought by Hocking.289 While the majority does not appear 
to have considered whether Birnbaum would permit the action 
in Hocking, they conceded that Hocking's action should be dis-
missed if nothing was transferred.270 
Hocking involved an investment in land and an "opportu-
nity" to solicit an offer to participate in an RP A. 271 Thus, the 
Hocking transaction may be too attenuated to qualify for a pri-
vate action even if an investment of money combined with an 
offer of management services were to qualify for a private action 
267. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1974) the Supreme 
Court recognized that a widely expanded class of private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 
might promote vexatious litigation. [d. at 740. See supra note 180 and accompanying 
text. Thus, the primary disadvantage with a broad definition of investment contract is 
that no matter how strictly the Brinbaum rule is applied, the potential number of vexa-
tious actions that can be brought under lOb-5 will increase. While a broad definition of 
security allows the SEC to exercise its administrative discretion in bringing actions, the 
SEC has no direct control over law suits brought by private plaintiffs. The SEC can 
recommend policies in its Amicus Briefs, but the rights of private plaintiffs are con-
trolled by Congress and the courts. 
268. If courts adopt a rule that excludes the Hocking transaction from the definition 
of investment contract, then the SEC would have no jurisdiction over the crooked used 
Condo dealer who fraudulently promotes investment opportunities in second hand con-
dominium units whose owners qualify to participate in RPA agreements. While the posi-
tion taken by the SEC in it's Hocking Amicus Brief suggests that the commission is not 
currently interested in regulating condominium sales, see Brief of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, Amicus Curiae, On Rehearing En Bane at 3, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 
7, 1988) (No. 85-1932), there is a major difference between exercising discretion not to 
regulate and defining jurisidiction so as to deprive the SEC of the ability to regulate. 
269. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d at 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 
503 (1988) (dissent's basic disagreement with majority is that the Libermans only sold a 
parcel of land and had no authority to commit Aetna or Hotel Corporation of the Pacific 
to allow Hocking to participate in the RPA). 
270. In Hocking, the majority remanded the case to the trial court to determine 
whether the offer to Hocking included an option to participate in a rental pool agree-
ment. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 562 n.l. The majority stated that the presence of an option 
represented a material question of fact which would require a trial, implying thereby 
that if no option was transferred, the case should be dismissed. Id. 
271. See supra note 14-17 and accompanying text. 
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under lOb-5.272 By insisting that the transaction does not qualify 
as an investment contract under Howey, however, the dissent 
may go too far. 
In SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,m the Supreme Court held that 
the 1933 Act prohibits the offer as well as the sale of unregis-
tered non-exempt securities.274 The Court stated that "it is 
enough that the [defendants] merely offer the essential ingredi-
ents of an investment contract."2711 Since a transaction could not 
possibly violate section 5 of the 1933 Act276 unless it involved a 
security, the mere offer to sell land combined with an offer of 
management services must necessarily be sufficient to define an 
investment contract.277 In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,278 
the Supreme Court used a "structure of the Acts" argument as 
basis for refusing to exclude private transactions from the defi-
nition of investment contract because such a definition would 
render section 4(2) of the 1933 Act279 superfluous.28o By analogy, 
it would appear that the "structure of the Acts" require that the 
definition of investment contract include offers of land and man-
agement contracts as well as sales of land and management con-
tracts because to exclude such offers from the definition of in-
vestment contract would render provisions distinguishing 
between offers and sales superfluous.281 
Hocking adopted the "mere offer is sufficient" language of 
272. See Jones v. International Inventors Inc. East, 429 F. Supp. 119, 126 (N.D. Ga. 
1976) (private action under 10b-5 where investment is accompanied by an offer of a man-
agement contract). 
273. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
274. Id. at 301. In Howey, the SEC institued an action under § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77e (1982), supra note 184. Howey, 328 U.S. at 294. The Court noted that while 
the registration requirement of § 5 refers to sales of securities, § 2(3) defines "sale" to 
include every "attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security 
for value. [d. at 301 n.6. 
275. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 n.6. 
276. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982); supra note 184. 
277. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 293. Since an action cannot be brought unless jurisdic-
tion exists, the circumstances that determine jurisidiction must necessarily be as broad 
as the circumstances that determine that a cause of action exists. 
278. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). 
279. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). 
280. [d. at 692. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
281. See, e.g., § 5(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982), supra note 184 (offer 
to buy or offer to sell securities) and § 5(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) 
(1982), supra note 184. 
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Howey282 under circumstances where a management contract 
was not offered, but merely available.283 A court may nonethe-
less find that acts performed by Dubois qualified as a solicita-
tion of an offer under the 1933 Act.284 Having found jurisdiction 
to exist through application of a liberal definition of the term 
"investment contract," the Ninth Circuit may wish to tailor the 
remedy available for real estate transactions under 10b-5 by 
adopting a strict interpretation of the Birnbaum rule that denies 
a private cause unless there is a purchase or sale with respect to 
each element of an investment contract.285 
B. THE PARADOX OF WHAT Is SOLD VERSUS WHAT IS PURCHASED 
The Court in SEC u. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.286 focused 
upon the offers and promises received by the investor and im-
plied that almost anything could be a security if sufficient em-
phasis was placed on the economic benefits of an investment.287 
In SEC u. W. J. Howey CO.,288 the Court emphasized the mana-
gerial efforts that would be assumed by the promoter.289 Hock-
282. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
283. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 569 n.9 (court acknowleged that neither buyer nor seller 
had an absolute legal right to enter into the RPA without the consent of the RPA 
manager). 
284. Howey interpreted the definition of "sale" in § 2(3} of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(3} (1982), as including "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an 
offer to buy." Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
285. For purposes of jurisidiction, the court could define investment contract as the 
offer of an investment, the offer to participate in a common enterprise and the offer to 
share profits earned by the efforts of third parties. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. For 
purposes of determining that a private right of action exists under 10b-5, the court could 
define a sale or purchase of an investment contract as an actual investment of money, 
actual participation in a common enterprise, and actual sharing of profits earned by the 
efforts of a third party. See Blue Chip Stamp, 421 U.S. at 731. 
286. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
287. [d. at 346. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
288. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
289. [d. at 299. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text. The Court noted that 
Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills were offering an opportunity to share in the 
profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly owned by Howey Co. The 
property and management contracts were offered to persons who resided in distant local-
ities and who lacked the equipment and experience to manage their own property. [d. at 
299-300. 
The third element of the test advocated in Joiner was "the plan of distribution and 
the economic inducements held out to the prospect." Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53. In 
Joiner, the Court analyzed the sales brochures distributed to offerees as well as the sub-
stance of the contractual obligations assumed by seller. [d. at 348-49. See supra note 49 
and accompanying text. 
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ing u. Dubois290 presented the Ninth Circuit with a real estate 
broker who offered Hocking property owned by the Libermans, 
management services provided by an unrelated RP A manager, 
and who emphasized the economic benefits of the package.291 
Hocking's lawsuit is not aimed at the seller of property or the 
manager of the RP A, but seeks relief from the broker and her 
employer.292 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile the difference be-
tween what the seller sold and what the buyer was offered 
through the use of a hypothetical option to support the notion 
that rights with respect to participation in Aetna's RP A were 
transferred with the condominium unit to Hocking.293 Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit in Hocking focused on the bundle of rights actu-
ally offered to the buyer.294 
The Ninth Circuit's option analysis significantly expands 
the possibility that an investment contract might exist.2911 Op-
290. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
291. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 563. See supra notes 15 and accompanying text. 
292. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 562. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. Note, 
however, that an agency relationship normally exists between a real estate broker and a 
seller. If the Libermans had been named as defendants in Hocking, they may have been 
held vicariously liable for violations of the securities laws by their agent, Maylee Dubois. 
293. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 569. The Hocking court expressly noted that the term 
option as used in the opinion did not connote that either Hocking or the Liberman's had 
an absolute right to enter into the pooling arrangement. [d. 
The court's use of a hypothetical option skates past the controversy concerning 
whether a binding collateral agreement is a necessary element of an investment contract 
or whether the unsupported representations of the offeror are sufficient. See supra notes 
135-139. Since Hocking recognized that no absolute right was transferred, the hypotheti-
cal option appears to be nothing more than a convenient label for the unsupported rep-
resentations of the broker. The Ninth Circuit's willingness to base an investment con-
tract on such an option implies that a binding collateral agreements is not a necessary 
element of an investment contract. 
294. [d. The court stated that any distinction based on the fact that elements of the 
investment contract were offered by two seperate entities rather than one single entity 
was precisely the form over substance interpretation that Congress, the SEC and the 
courts have sought to avoid. [d. While the investment contract at issue in Hocking in-
volved a condominium unit offered by the Libermans and a RP A offered by Aetna, the 
Hocking court noted that in Howey, the land was offered by one Company and the man-
agement contract was offered by a separate company. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 569. 
295. [d. at 569. Hocking alleged that the rental pool arrangement was an option 
available to anyone buying a unit in the condominium project. [d. Consequently, anyone 
purchasing a condominium unit would be deemed to have acquired the option to partici-
pate in the rental pool when they purchased the unit and will therefore have satisfied the 
three criteria of the Howey test. [d. at 568. 
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tion analysis is built on an implicit assumption that RP A's are 
limited to individual condominium developments.296 If some-
body were to create an RP A in which every condominium owner 
in the U.S. was entitled to participate, then every condominium 
in the U.S. would qualify as an investment contract under Hock-
ing because the sale of any such unit would include an option to 
participate in the nationwide RP A. 297 
Note also that by shifting focus from the promotional ef-
forts of the seller to the actual rights offered to the buyer the 
court implies that neither the buyer nor the seller298 need have 
actual knowlege of the RPA at the time of sale.299 The "option" 
to participate in an RP A is transferred at the time of sale re-
gardless of whether the seller is aware that the RP A exists or 
whether the seller tells the buyer that the RP A exists and re-
gardless of whether the buyer is aware that he is receiving an 
"option" in addition to the condominium unit.30o The notion 
that parties can transfer rights even when they are unaware that 
the rights exist is a logical extension of the option concept, but 
greatly exceeds the intended scope of the securities laws.30l 
296. [d. The court noted that according to Hocking, the RPA was an optional ar-
rangement available to anyone buying a unit in the condominium project. [d. 
297. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
298. There is no real need to attempt to imply that a seller sold a security if the 
seller is not a defendant to the action. Dubois is the defendant and is alleged to have 
made fraudulent representations with respect to the sale of a security. Hocking, 839 F.2d 
at 562-563. If the "bundle of rights" offered by Dubois to Hocking qualified as an invest-
ment contract, it should not matter that the rights were acquired from several sources, 
none of which qualified as an investment contract in and of themselves. 
299. [d. The dissent argued that all that the Libermans were selling was a parcel of 
property. [d. 
300. [d. at 569. The court noted that there was no reason to assume that the option 
to participate in the RPA somehow mysteriously disappeared from the scene just be-
cause the Libermans did not exercise the option and enter the RPA. [d. Similarily, there 
would be no reason to assume that an option to participate in an unaffiliated RP A 
should disappear merely because none of the parties are aware that it exists. As the 
Hocking court sought to avoid a definition of investment contract that would make the 
status of a given condominium unit dependent on whether the preceding owner had 
elected to participate in an RPA, [d. at 570, it is unlikely that they would support a 
definition that made the status of a given condominium unit dependent on either the 
buyer's or seller's subjective knowlege at the time of sale. 
301. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 n. 6. The Court noted that the registration require-
ments of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1982), supra note 184, refers to sales of 
securities and that § 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982), defines "sales" to 
include every "attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy," a secur-
ity. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 n.6. While there is no authority to support the notion that 
availability, in and of itself, constitutes an offer, any method by which knowlege of such 
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C. DOCTRINES OFFERED To THE COURTS 
In Hocking, the Ninth Circuit was asked to incorporate sev-
eral doctrines into the definition of investment contract to re-
flect certain policy considerations. The court was asked to mod-
ify the definition of investment contract to exclude private, as 
opposed to public transactions,S02 to exclude transactions involv-
ing secondary as opposed to primary markets,S08 and to exclude 
transactions in which there was no linkage between the parties 
offering property and management services. 30. However reasona-
ble the doctrines may appear in the context of Hocking, they are 
either unsupported or in direct or apparent conflict with estab-
lished authority8011 and represent potential loopholes through 
which fraudulent promoters might seek to evade the reach of 
SEC and the securities laws. 
The doctrine distinguishing between public and private 
transactions was developed in Marine Bank v. Weaver806 and 
apparently rejected in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth using a 
"structure of the Acts" analysis.s07 In Hocking, the dissent dis-
tinguished between a promoter offering to the general public 
and the owner of an individual condominium unit offering his 
property for sale.808 The dissent argued that the fact that a pro-
spective buyer might be able to reach an arrangement with the 
developer's rental pool should not make every sale by an indi-
vidual unit owner a security.809 The dissent's position would ap-
availability was made known, however, may constitute an "attempt or offer to dispose 
of' and therfore come under the definition of a sale in § 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(3) (1982). 
302. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text. 
303. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text. The brief filed by the SEC as 
Amicus Curiae on rehearing en bane argues that unless there is an affiliation or selling 
arrangement between the seller of a condominium and the rental pool operator, the con-
dominium sale and the procurement of management services are two separate transac-
tions. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curaie. On Rehearing 
En Bane at 8, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
305. See supra notes 102-124 and accompanying text. 
306. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. 
307. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text. 
308. See Hocking, 839 F.2d at 571 (Hug J. dissenting). 
309. Id. If the bundle of rights offered or sold by individual condominiun owners 
satisfy the definition of an investment contract, there is no reason that the transaction 
should not qualify as a security merely because of its size or because it is privately nego-
tiated. See Id. Note that the fact that a transaction qualifies as a security does not neces-
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pear to conflict with the Landreth Court's refusal to exempt pri-
vately negotiated transactions from the securities laws.slo 
There does not appear to be any authority supporting a 
doctrine that incorporates the distinction between primary and 
secondary markets into the definition of investment contract.Sll 
However, the Landreth "structure of the Acts" argument would 
reject distinctions that render provisions of the securities law su-
perfluous.S12 Furthermore, if a secondary market exemption was 
read into the definition of investment contract, a fraudulent pro-
moter might succeed in evading the securities laws altogether by 
passing title through an intermediary before selling the security 
on the "secondary" market. SIS 
sarily mean that the securities laws will be applied. See, e.g., § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982) (SEC may exempt certain classes of transactions from registration 
under the 1933 Act). Fears that Hocking might require every condominium owner to 
comply with the registration provisions of the 1933 Act are foolish given the express 
exemption in § 4(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1982) (exemption for any person 
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer from the registration provisions) and § 4(2) 
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982) (exempting private transactions from the re-
gistration provisions). 
310. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692. The law distinguishing between public and pri-
vate transactions has been fairly well developed through litigation involving the registra-
tion exemption for an issue that is not a public offering, Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 
U.S.C. section 77d(2) (1982). See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) 
(availability of the private offering exemption under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act). 
If the definition of investment contract is deemed to exclude certain private transac-
tions, the courts would have to settle the meaning of "not a public offering" for purposes 
of determining jurisidiction in addition to applying exisiting law defining "not a public 
offering" for purposes of the exemption from registration of transactions that qualify as 
securities. 
311. The amicus brief filed by the Hawaii Association of Realtors argues that SEC 
Release 5347, 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988), does not apply to secondary transactions, but 
does not cite any authority other than a statement in Release 5347 providing that it was 
issued "to alert persons engaged in the business of building and selling condominiums 
and similar types of real estate developments to their responsibilities under the Securi-
ties Act and to provide guidelines for a determination of when an offering of condomini-
ums or other units may be viewed as an offering of securities." Amicus Curiae Brief of 
the Hawaii Association of Realtors In Support of Defendants/Appellees In Rehearing En 
Banc at 5-6, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
There is a logical flaw to the association's argument. Release 5347 cannot compel 
condominium developers to comply with securities registration laws unless the underly-
ing transaction qualifies as a security. Given that the transactions described in Release 
5347 qualify as securities for registration purposes, they do not suddenly stop qualifying 
as securities for other purposes or because Release 5347 ceases to apply. 
312. See supra note 112-113 and accompanying text. 
313. Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982) would classify such an 
intermediary as an underwriter and hold him strictly liable for the omission of any mate-
rial fact under § 11(a)(5) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1982). If a transaction 
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When the sale of real estate in conjunction with manage-
ment services is held to constitute an investment contract, there 
is often a relationship or linkage between the party selling the 
property and the party offering management services. S14 While 
there do not appear to be any cases that require such relation-
ship or linkage,Slll both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have ex-
pressly rejected the notion that an investment contract will not 
exist unless there is some sort of linkage between the individual 
selling property and the individual offering management ser-
vices. S16 If the Ninth Circuit were to adopt a linkage require-
ment, a crooked promoter could evade the securities laws alto-
gether by offering either the land or the management services 
through an appropriate intermediary.S17 
passing through such an intermediary does not qualify as a security because of an exclu-
sion read into the definition of investment contract, then neither § 2 nor § 11 of the 1933 
Act would apply. The courts would have to develop rules defining the circumstances 
under which a transaction following the sale through an intermediary would qualify as a 
"secondary" market. 
314. The amicus brief filed by the SEC argues that there is a linkage requirement 
and cites the following cases in support of the proposition that real estate transactions 
have been found to qualify as investment contracts in cases where linkage existed: 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 294-95 (W. J. Howey Co., offeror of land sales, and Howey-in-the-
Hills, offeror of land management contracts, under common control); Cameron v. Out-
door Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1979) (promoter had exclusive 
right to rent condominium campsites in the absence of the owner); Hodges v. H & R 
Investments, 668 F. Supp. 545, 548 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (promoter sold condominium and 
guaranteed rental income); Wooldridge Homes v. Bronze Tree, 558 F. Supp. 1085, 1087 
(D. Colo. 1983) (promoter sold property and offered managerial services). Brief of the 
Securities And Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, On Rehearing En Banc at 9-10, 
Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
315. While the amicus brief filed by the SEC argues that there is a linkage require-
ment and cites cases in which linkage existed, see supra note 314, no cases are cited as 
requiring linkage before a real estate transaction will be found to qualify as an invest-
ment contract. See Brief Of The Securities And Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, 
On Rehearing En Bane at 10-11, Hocking, (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
316. See Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967); Roe v. 
Wade, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961). See supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text. 
317. Just as an intermediary could be used to convert a transaction from the pri-
mary market to the secondary market, see supra 313 and accompanying text, an inter-
mediary could also be used to avoid a linkage requirement. The courts would have to 
develop case law defining the types of relationships that would or would not establish 
sufficient linkage for a transaction in which property and management services are of-
fered by different entities. See, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294-5 (1945) 
(property and management services offered by separate corporations under common con-
trol qualified as an investment contract). 
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D. NINTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATION OF RELEASE 5347 
In Hocking, the Ninth Circuit adopted Release 5347318 as 
controlling in lOb-5 actions involving condominiums,319 but 
failed to clarify the effect that the representations of an offeror 
bear on a condominium's status as an investment contract. The 
Ninth Circuit held that condominium investments satisfying the 
second scenario of Release 5347320 will also satisfy the Howey321 
definition of investment contract,322 but did not consider the 
converse, that investments that fail to qualify under the second 
Release 5347 scenario may still qualify as securities under 
Howey. Where there is ample emphasis on the economic benefits 
to be derived by the purchaser through the effort of a third 
party, the faCt that an RP A exists but is not deemed to have 
been offered will not prevent the condominium from meeting the 
Howey criteria and qualifying as a security.323 
The Ninth Circuit stated that the bright line rule of Release 
5347 provides the only proper interpretation of Howey as ap-
plied to condominiums and that the second Release 5347 scena-
rio is meant to provide exclusive coverage for transactions that 
involve an RP A. 324 While the court's statement may represent 
an accurate analysis of the SEC's intent, it results in an unnec-
essarily restrictive interpretation of Howey, given the Ninth Cir-
cuit's willingness to accept vertical commonality.326 If the 
318. 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988). See supra note 154·158 and accompanying text. 
319. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 568. 
320. 17 C.F.R. § 231.5347 (1988). See supra note 154-158 and accompanying text. 
321. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
322. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566. 
323. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-299. The Howey definition of an investment con-
tract involves a scheme where a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is 
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. [d. Assum-
ing that a common enterprise is deemed to exist, it would appear that any purchaser of 
property who is led to believe that he can receive profits through the efforts of others has 
purchased an investment contract even if no opportunity actually exists. 
324. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 565 n.6. The court stated that while the language of the 
first Release 5347 scenario "is general, ostensibly covering 'any rental arrangement; giv-
ing that phrase an all inclusive interpretation would render meaningless the language of 
[the second Release 5347 scenario)." [d. 
325. The court's statement implies that the criteria of the first Release 5347 scena-
rio, emphasis on economic benefits, are irrelevant if an RPA is involved. While economic 
emphasis will not matter if an RPA is offered or sold in a manner that qualifies as the 
offer or sale of an investment contract, economic emphasis could be very important 
where, as in Hocking, there is some question as to whether the RPA has been offered in a 
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Libermans' offer to sell did not include an RPA and therefore 
lacked horizontal commonality, vertical commonality should be 
examined.826 Similarly, if the second Release 5347 criteria fails 
because an RP A was available but not offered, or offered on 
terms that were not sufficiently binding, then the facts should be 
analyzed under the first Release 5347 scenario to determine if 
there was sufficient economic emphasis to create an investment 
contract. 
Although Hocking involves an action brought under the an-
tifraud provisions of Rule lOb_5,827 the Ninth Circuit found the 
Release 5347 guidelines concerning registration of condominium 
developments under section 5 of the 1933 Act828 to be control-
ling.829 By applying Release 5347 to a action under Rule lOb-5, 
the Ninth Circuit implies that statements in Release 5347 pur-
porting to limit its scope to the registration of developers are of 
no import.88o One explanation for the court's position is that a 
transaction cannot be required to register under the securities 
law unless it qualifies as a security.881 Once a transaction quali-
fies as a security, it will not suddenly cease to be a security 
merely because a different section of the securities laws is ap-
plied or because a broker or owner rather than a promoter is 
involved.882 While it is possible to back into logic that supports 
the Ninth Circuit's view of the status of Release 5347, the status 
of the release would be clearer if the court had explained why it 
manner that will qualify the transaction as an investment contract. 
The interplay between the "bundle of rights" transferred and the nature of the 
"promises made by the offeror" has not yet been settled with respect to real estate trans-
actions. See supra note 135-139 and accompanying text. Release 5347 appears to em-
brace both "the bundle of rights" (second scenario focusing on RPA) and "promises 
made by the offeror" (first scenario focusing on economic emphasis). In Hocking, the 
majority relied solely on the second scenario and found it to be controlling. Hocking, 839 
F.2d at 565. On the other hand, the dissent argued that the first Release 5347 scenario 
appeared to be "reasonably accurate" but that the second Release 5347 scenario "moved 
away from Howey." 1d. at 572. 
326. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 567. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
327. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1987). See supra note 161. 
328. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). See supra note 184. 
329. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566. 
330. Release 5347 provides that it was issued "to alert persons engaged in the busi-
ness of building and selling condominiums and similar types of real estate developments 
to their responsibilities under the Securities Act and to provide guidelines for a determi-
nation of when an offering of condominiums or other units may be viewed as an offering 
of securities." Release 5347, 17 C.F.R. 231.5347 (1988). 
331. See § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). See supra note 184. 
332. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
58
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/13
1989] SECURITIES LAW 235 
was disregarding the statements in the release purporting to 
limit its application. sss 
E. CONFLICT BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS 
. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Co. ss. and SEC v. W. J. Howey 
CO. SSII each reflect a distinct type of real estate transaction that 
should be carefully distinguished by the courts.SS6 In Hocking v. 
Dubois,SS7 there is little question that an RPA qualifies as a 
pooling arrangement involving the expectation of profits from 
the efforts of others. sss Where the purchaser voluntarily joins an 
RP A, the question arises as to whether the RP A arrangement 
merely involves a delegation of managerial rights held by the 
owner or evidence of the buyers dependence on other parties. sse 
When a tourist purchases a Hawaiian resort condominium from 
his home in Las Vegas, the RPA may represent the only practi-
cal way that the purchaser can realize the profits promised by 
his realtor.s•o 
Hocking involves a Howey-type transaction where the man-
agement services at issue would be performed on the income 
producing property purchased by Hocking, rather than on a 
neighboring piece of property as in Joiner. Consequently, the 
holdings in Joiner-type cases requiring a collateral agreementSn 
or disregarding promises that were not reflected in the sale con-
333. On rehearing, the en banc court will probably elaborate on the status of the 
provisions in Release 5347 that attempt to limit its application. The defendants, the SEC 
and the Hawaiian Association of Realtors all raised the issue in their briefs on rehearing 
en banco See Joint Brief of Appellees Maylee Dubois and Vitousek & Dick Realtors, Inc. 
On Rehearing En Banc at 43, Hocking (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932); Brief of the 
Securities And Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, On Rehearing En Banc at 13, 
Hocking (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932); Brief of the Hawaiian Association of Real-
tors In Support of Defendants/Appellees In Rehearing En Banc at 5-6, Hocking (9th Cir. 
Dec. 7, 1988) (No. 85-1932). 
334. 320 U.S. 344 (1943). 
335. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
336. See supra notes 125-144 and accompanying text. 
337. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
338. See [d. at 565 (an offering of a condominium with an RPA will automatically 
qualify as an investment contract). 
339. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text; supra notes 140-144 and ac-
companying text. 
340. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra note 135. 
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tract342 are distinguishable and should not necessarily apply to 
Hocking.343 The Ninth Circuit could greatly improve the clarity 
of the case law defining investment contracts with respect to real 
estate transaction if it would distinguish precedent involving 
Howey-type transactions from precedent involving Joiner-type 
transactions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hocking u. Dubois3H provides the Ninth Circuit with an op-
portunity to map one of the most complex and uncharted re-
gions of the securities law. Since Hocking addresses such a wide 
range of unresolved investment contract issues, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's en banc decision upon rehearing is likely to exert a major 
influence on subsequent investment contract cases. Whether the 
Ninth Circuit's decision serves to settle the law or to set off a 
wide ranging controversy that must ultimately be settled by the 
Supreme Court will depend on how successfully the court pro-
vides guidelines to the disposition of the issues discussed in this 
note. Regardless of whether Hocking's condominium is found to 
be an investment contract, the one goal that investors, develop-
ers, real estate brokers and the courts all have in common is a 
desire for rules that will advise them of where they stand when 
investors come seeking profits in paradise. 
Peter A. MacLaren* 
342. See supra note 138. 
343. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text. Although Hocking involves a 
Howey-type transaction, the following Joiner-type transactions were cited in Hocking as 
examples of real estate transactions that did not qualify as investment contracts: De Luz 
Ranchos Inv. Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (no 
investment contract even though the developer's marketing plan promoted appreciation 
to be realized from neighboring development because developer was only obligated to 
transfer title); Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1978) (no invest-
ment contract although developer represented that self sufficient community would be 
built nearby because promoter only had to deliver title); Happy Investment Group v. 
Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (no investment 
contract where literature gave impression that subdivision would be built because no 
concrete promise was made). See Hocking, 839 F.2d at 564. 
344. 839 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted en bane, 852 F.2d 503 (1988). 
• Golden Gate University School Qf Law, Class of 1989. 
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